

Society for Economics Research in India
Working Paper Series

PARTICIPATORY THEATER EMPOWERS WOMEN: EVIDENCE
FROM INDIA

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Working Paper No. 12
<http://seri-india.org/research>

February 2021

Participatory Theater Empowers Women: Evidence from India

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February 22, 2021

Domestic violence is common, costly, yet widely accepted. Neither legal prohibition nor economic growth can stop it. Can participatory theater – a novel, cultural intervention – make it socially unacceptable? Community-based participatory theater gives communities the means, in fictional but nonetheless familiar situations, of analyzing oppression, interrogating the oppressors, rehearsing resistance, and negotiating standards of behavior. This paper is the first large-scale impact evaluation. We use an endogenous treatment model and a random sample of over 3,000 married couples in West Bengal, India to estimate the impact on domestic violence of village exposure to *Jana Sanskriti*, one of the world’s largest participatory theater organizations. We find that it reduced physical abuse by a quarter and reduced by half the proportion of husbands who viewed wife beating as legitimate. By motivating individuals to rescript stories of oppression and rethink their collective representations of domestic violence and masculinity, participatory theater triggered durable social change.

Keywords: social norm, domestic violence, narrative, framing, gender, patriarchy

JEL codes: J12, J16, K42, L82, Z13

Acknowledgements. The World Bank Research Support Budget and the Centre for Training and Research in Public Finance and Policy, Kolkata, provided financial support for this research. We benefitted from comments from Sheheryar Banuri, Kaushik Basu, Sourav Bhattacharya, Annette Brown, Stefan Dercon, Willemien Kets, Eliana La Ferrara, Sandip Mitra, Dilip Mookherjee, Victor Orozco, Joan Ricart-Huguet, Arijit Sen, Rohini Somanathan, and Ralph Yarrow. We are also grateful for discussions with participants at the First International Conference in Ashoka University, the West Bengal Conference at the Indian Statistical Institute in Kolkata, the XXIX Tax Day Conference at the Max Planck Institute in Munich, the 2018 ERINN conference at Oxford, the NIMBios Conference on Social Norms, the 2018 ASREC conference, and seminars at the University of East Anglia, Cornell University, the World Bank and CEDIL. Jalan thanks the Institute for Advanced Studies in Nantes for hosting her in the year when she began analyzing the data. This work would not have been possible without the support of *Jana Sanskriti*, our field investigators, and especially Jharna Panda, who supervised the survey with great diligence.

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Man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun.

Clifford Geertz¹

Domestic violence against women occurs frequently around the globe, with large harms to women's and children's health and at a cost of trillions of dollars per year (Boudet *et al.* 2013; WHO 2013; Hoeffler 2017). In many low- and lower middle-income countries, the prevalence of violence against women has shaped their values and reduced their agency. The percentage of women who believe that a husband is justified to hit or beat his wife if she transgresses traditional gender roles is 63 percent in Ethiopia, 58 percent in Uganda, 32 percent in Peru, and 22 percent in India (for the full set of countries and the specified list of possible justifications for a husband to hit or beat his wife, see Table A-1). A statement by a woman in rural Ethiopia illustrates widely shared attitudes: "It is sometimes necessary for husbands to beat their wives when they commit mistakes to correct them...it is also a sign of strong manhood" (Narayan *et al.* 2000, 122). One of the most popular cultural beliefs among males in rural north India is that a "woman is no better than a man's shoe" (Chowdhry 2015, 7). Such beliefs are rooted in stories people learn from childhood of the 'natural' gender hierarchy. This paper tests the hypothesis that community participatory theater—a novel, cultural intervention—can shift the focus of attention in spousal violence from the masculinity of the husband to the cruelty to the wife and make domestic violence socially unacceptable.

Unless it becomes socially unacceptable, widespread domestic violence cannot be stopped by legal prohibition and economic growth. Between 1990 and 2010, a wave of countries enacted laws against domestic violence for the first time, but they have only half-heartedly been enforced where domestic violence is socially accepted (Htun and Jensenius

¹ From *The Interpretation of Cultures* (Geertz 1973, 5).

2019).² Economic growth has some positive effects on women’s empowerment, and women’s empowerment promotes the transition of a society from stagnation to sustained growth, but the links between economic growth and women’s empowerment are too weak to stop domestic violence or to lead to women’s equality with men (Duflo 2012; Diebolt and Perrin 2013; Heise and Kotsadam 2015). For example, in some developing countries, women who participate in the market labor force or who have more education are *more* likely to suffer domestic violence than those who do not (*e.g.*, Jejeebhoy and Cook 1997, Erten and Keskin 2018).

Education entertainment (*edutainment*), which communicates information in a narrative frame with fictional characters, has influenced some behaviors, *e.g.*, consumption of iron-fortified salt (Banerjee, Barnhardt, and Duflo 2018), unsafe sex (Banerjee, La Ferrara, and Orozco 2019a), and reporting of corruption (Blair, Littman, and Paluck 2019), but has had mixed success with domestic violence. Two evaluations have been conducted to date. Banerjee, La Ferrara, and Orozco (2019b) find that in Nigeria, watching eight episodes of the MTV drama *Shuga* reduced men’s tolerance for wife beating but made a “precisely estimated zero change” in women’s judgments of its acceptability. Green, Wilke, and Cooper (2018, 3) find that in Uganda, watching three videos of domestic dramas in which a woman’s injury or death might have been prevented if bystanders had reported the abuse at an early stage increased women’s willingness to bear witness to domestic violence, but that “the campaign failed in many respects: we did not change audiences’ core values about the morality of VAW” (violence against women).

² Chen (2020) describes the lax enforcement in one of the more than 900 cases in China of women who have died at the hands of their husbands or partners since China enacted a law against domestic violence in 2016. In the case that Chen describes, the police ignored three appeals for help by the wife because the violence she faced was “your personal family matter.” The government agency in charge of protecting women’s rights dismissed her injuries since “other women were worse off.” In 2020, her assailant, who was by then her ex-husband, doused her with gasoline and set her on fire. The attack attracted national attention because, by chance, it was livestreamed in China.

Our paper is the first large-scale evaluation of community participatory theater as a means to change the social meaning of domestic violence and reduce its incidence. We evaluate a form of theater called *Forum theater*—so-called because it creates a forum for dialogue between actors and the audience. Forum theater gives communities the means of analyzing oppression in fictional but nonetheless familiar situations, interrogating the oppressors to better understand the thinking that underlies their behavior, rehearsing resistance, and negotiating standards.

The Brazilian dramatist and activist Augusto Boal developed Forum theater in the 1970s as part of a set of tools that he called Theater of the Oppressed. He was influenced by Paulo Freire (1970), who argued that to learn how to stop oppression, an individual must be a *co-creator* of the knowledge and develop the self-confidence to act on it. In a patriarchal society, women may become emotionally dependent on their oppressive husbands and subsumed in rigidly prescribed roles. Recall from Table A-1 that a large proportion of women in low- and lower middle-income countries think it's right that they are beaten if they do something that their husbands do not like. As long as they hold that view, they will lack the self-confidence to resist oppression. The purpose of Theater of the Oppressed is to induce men and women, little by little, to think critically about oppression and to try out forms of rebellious action (Freire 1970, 64; Boal 1985, 47; Ganguly 2017, 135, 145). We discuss the role of narratives in decision making in Section I.

In every performance, a stark drama is enacted without interruption. Then it is repeated with interruptions by volunteers from the audience who, individually, come onstage, take the role of a character, and try out a strategy to end the oppression that others will find persuasive. As Boal (121-122) states, the volunteer (spectator-actor or *spect-actor*) “launches into action. No matter that the action is fictional; what matters is that it is action,” since Forum theater seeks to promote a sense of power. The other actors, who maintain their roles, are trained to

respond to a spect-actor in a way that problematizes her (or his) demands. In Section II, we give information on the methodology of Theater of the Oppressed.

We evaluate Theater of the Oppressed by assessing the impact of one of the largest organizations in the world that performs it—*Jana Sanskriti (JS)* (in translation, “People’s Culture”). It is a non-profit, independent organization. In 2013, the year before our evaluation began, *JS* had 500-600 actors in community-based teams (Ganguly 2017, 86). Nearly all *JS* performers were from families of agricultural laborers. The gender balance among performers, spect-actors, and the audience was roughly even (Ganguly 2017, 91; Yarrow 2017, 31).

We designed a survey, discussed in Section III, similar to the National Family Health Surveys of India (International Institute for Population Sciences and ICF 2017). The respondents are random samples of married women and their husbands from 92 villages—32 villages in which *JS* has performed for at least 10 years, and 60 villages in which *JS* has never performed. Female field investigators interviewed in private more than 3,000 married women. In all except 1 percent of the cases, their husbands were located and interviewed (at approximately the same time) by male field investigators. We exclude the 1 percent of the observations where the male and female respondents are not a husband-wife pair, since we often wish to compare wives’ responses with their husbands’. The results do not change qualitatively if we include those observations in our estimations.

A strength of *JS* is that it is community-based and has grown organically by drawing on individuals—as actors and as organizers of *JS* satellite teams³—who live in the area where the teams perform. To find out if community participatory theater can change harmful norms, *JS* is thus a particularly favorable case to evaluate. But the process of growth of *JS* also poses the central methodological challenge to evaluating its impact: the selection of villages where

³ Each of the *JS* satellite teams has existed between 10 and 30 years and regularly performs in 12-19 villages (Ganguly 2019, 371).

JS performs could be endogenous.⁴ We discussed several times with *JS* whether there were any systematic criteria for selecting the villages where *JS* regularly performs, but got no unambiguous answer. Even without any such criteria, there might be something special about the villages where the satellite teams are based, and the selection process of the villages in which a team performs might not be random. A satellite team might have chosen a village because it seemed to have a large potential for change or to be especially receptive to *JS*; the estimated impact would then be biased upward. It is also possible that a satellite team selected a village because it had an extreme problem of domestic violence; the estimated impact of *JS* would then be biased downward.

We estimate an endogenous treatment model with a binary treatment at the village level and binary outcome variables (*e.g.*, whether or not a husband physically forced his wife to have sexual intercourse or perform other sexual acts that she did not want to). The treatment variable takes a value 1 if *JS* has performed in the village for at least 10 years⁵, and zero if *JS* has never performed in the village. We explain our econometric strategy in Section IV. We model the selection of a village for *JS* performances as determined by village-level demographic and economic data reported in the 1991 Census of India.

We find that exposure of a village to *JS* significantly reduced physical and sexual abuse of women by their husbands and marginally reduced emotional abuse (see Section V). The proportion of abuse-free marriages increased by 29 percent. In the subsample of couples in which the husband drinks, the proportion with episodes of alcohol-related abuse decreased by 38 percent (according to the wives' responses, which is a smaller decline than that according to the husbands' responses).

⁴ We focus on initial selection because in no cases did a team stop performing in a village once it had been selected. There have been some unruly disruptions (primarily by men) during *JS* performances, but *JS* teams were never intimidated into stopping to perform in a village.

⁵ We use this period because before 2002 there was no systematic record keeping on the number of *JS* performances, even though *JS* had started performing Forum theater in the mid-1990's.

The reduction in abuse suggests that *JS* changed the extent to which men exercised power over their wives. The evidence bears this out. Village exposure to *JS* increased the proportion of married women who participated in making at least one of seven major household decisions, such as how many children to try to bear and when the wife can visit her parents.

JS changed not only behavior but also husbands' attitudes. It cut by nearly half the proportion of husbands who believed that domestic violence was justified in some situations. A husband's self-reported attitudes are consistent with his behavior as reported by his wife. The wives of men who said that domestic violence was justified under none of the seven circumstances specified in the survey were significantly more likely to have abuse-free marriages than the wives of men who believed that domestic violence was justifiable under some of the specified circumstances.

In Section VI, we present evidence that *JS* had a deep and persistent impact on gender relations in households in the villages where it performed for at least 10 years. Villages are divided into 1-3 areas served by different electoral polling booths. Within each treatment village, we distinguish the area of the booth where *JS* normally performed (call it the "active area") from the areas of booths where it did not perform ("inactive areas"). We assess *spillovers* within treatment villages by comparing outcomes for couples who live in the active area and couples who live in inactive areas. We assess *persistence* by comparing impacts in treatment villages with, and without, a performance of a *JS* play on patriarchy or alcohol issues in the four years preceding our survey. We find evidence of both spillovers and persistence: there is no significant difference between the subsamples that we compare.

Our results suggest that mechanisms other than an individual's personal exposure to *JS* performances are responsible for the impacts. Awareness of a new set of ideas and a group that supports them may create a social identity that spreads through social networks. Role model effects are another mechanism through which an impact on one person can spill over to a group.

For instance, Moreira (2019) shows that national recognition of a student's outstanding performance in math can change the beliefs, norms, and aspirations of her classmates. In Forum theater, volunteers from the audience (male as well as female) take the role of female characters and speak up to resist oppression. Women who are strong and forthright, as well as men who show empathy for them, may gain respect and admiration. They may become role models. A revised social meaning of masculinity may become a part of the village *zeitgeist*, and women with a new sense of power may take collective action to address their problems.

Here is one instance of women coming together after watching a *JS* performance to address alcohol abuse. The example bears on pathways of causation through shaming and reporting abuse to the police:

Barnalata watched a *JS* performance about a husband who is an alcoholic with no work. Out of financial desperation to support their five children, the wife in the play sends her oldest child, a 13-year-old daughter, with a distant relative to work in Kolkata. A few months later, a woman from the village who went to Kolkata tells the couple that she had seen their daughter in a brothel. After watching the *JS* play, several women in the village discuss the problem of alcohol abuse. They pledge to stop the sale of alcohol in their village. They also decide to register a complaint at the local police station against a man in their community who harasses his wife for money to buy alcohol. (*Source*: Summary of *JS* records of discussions of spectators onsite in Parthapratima, following the play.)

We present in Section VII a simple model of norm compliance in which new impulses and new ways of framing domestic violence can have a large impact on the proportion of husbands who follow patriarchal norms.

I. Related Literatures: Cultural Foundations of Economic Behavior in Shared Stories and Motivated Reasoning

This paper contributes to two literatures. First, it contributes to the young body of work on the impact of stories on decision making. Culture provides the collective stories through which individuality is lived: they *mediate* our experience (Bruner 1986; Schank 1990; Swidler 2001; Collier 2016; Akerlof and Rayo 2020). Experiments suggest that some stories channel

and narrow our attention, influence how causal relationships are understood or misunderstood, and by making a moral point influence how we interpret and respond to reality. (Hoff and Stiglitz 2010; Hoff and Pandey 2014; Akerlof and Snower 2016; Banerjee *et al.* 2018; Brooks, Hoff, and Pandey 2018; Banerjee *et al.* 2019; Blair *et al.* 2019; Shiller 2019). To affect behavior, a story must have elements that are imagined as real (*i.e.*, possible, logical, or probable in terms of elements that exist in the social world). Stories that can be imagined as real are cognitive resources that may strengthen or loosen existing social arrangements. Stories influence impulses, attitudes, and expectations and can reveal inconsistencies in beliefs. As one agricultural worker said, he realized only after seeing a *JS* play that the abusive actions his boss took towards him were similar to certain actions that the worker took towards his wife (Ganguly 2017, 100). Akerlof (2020) views the neglect of stories in economics as a “sin of omission.”

Some stories make what exists but was hardly noticed (such as the suffering of oppressed women) ‘stand out’ and assume the character of a problem that needs to be solved. For example, the popular Mexican movie “Roma” depicted the suffering due to classism and racism of two Mexicans from indigenous communities who are employed as domestic workers in an upper middle-class family in Mexico City. The movie created a cultural awareness that led, one year later, to unanimous approval in Mexico’s Congress of a bill granting rights of social protections, paid vacation, Christmas bonuses, and days off to the two million domestic workers in the country (Aparicio 2020).

But a story can also create a misleading picture that limits what people perceive or can imagine. After the U.S. Civil War, the Southern White elite used stories of crimes of Black men to enlist support for the suppression of their political rights. “Because of a ‘daily barrage of Negro atrocity stories,’ the familiar image of an inferior but not malign Black was replaced by the image of a lustful, violent, aggressive Black who had been guilty of crimes against Whites (and would commit them again, given the chance)” (Glaeser 2005, 67). Using these stories,

many Southern Whites represented as justice lynching Black men who tried to exercise their political rights. Wilkerson (2020) is a popular account of stories that historically created beliefs in *Untermenschen*.

The second literature to which this paper contributes concerns motivated reasoning. Many people are willing to believe nonsensical things if it suits their ideological biases (*e.g.*, Kahan *et al.* 2017 and the overview in Brooks 2021). To overcome the filters that block learning, active engagement is necessary; mere exposure to information is not enough. Economists have demonstrated that ideological blinders can be pierced by engaging in activities that shift one's attention to the overlooked problem (Jha and Shayo 2019), that expose communities to new, local prototypes (Beaman *et al.* 2009); or that create sustained opportunities for cooperation with members of a stigmatized group (Rao 2019). All these interventions entailed costly real-life activities. Our paper shows that learning and social change can be sparked merely by imagining and acting out onstage alternative household and village relations in community-based participatory theater.

II. Theater of the Oppressed and *Jana Sanskriti*

A. What is Theater of the Oppressed?

Theater of the Oppressed is participatory theater designed to promote critical thinking about oppressive forces in the spectators' lives. Community-based Theater of the Oppressed, which we evaluate in this paper, is performed by people who live in, or near, the communities from which they draw their audiences.

Forum theater is the best-known practice of Theater of the Oppressed. Each performance presents both a play and its analysis. To make this possible, Boal created two theatrical conventions —the *spect-actor* and the *joker*. The *spect-actor* is a member of the audience who goes onstage to replace one of the actors. The *joker* coordinates a series of spect-

actors and facilitates discussion between the actors and the audience by addressing questions to them. A performance of Forum theater has two parts. The first part magnifies situations of real-life oppression that the playwrights have learned about from meetings held in the communities where the plays are performed (Ganguly 2017, 91). Plays are scripted by adding structure and aesthetic value. The first part of the performance is a way to ‘hook’ audiences into the analysis of an issue.

At the end of the first part, the joker asks whether everyone in the audience agrees with the actions that were taken onstage; some people will probably say no. The joker explains that the play will begin again, and a spectator can at any point shout “freeze,” go onstage, take the role of a victim from whatever point in the play that he or she wants the scene to be taken forward, and try to stop the oppression. (If there are no volunteers, the joker shouts “freeze” and the actors freeze in various positions until someone volunteers to go onstage (Ganguly 2010, 28).)

The actors respond to a spect-actor in such a way as to explore the potential of the spect-actor’s actions to bring about change in real life (Yarrow 2009, 6). The joker does not steer people towards solutions to the problems presented in the drama, but rather elicits their ideas (Ganguly 2010, 38). If necessary, the joker frames the scope for participation by spect-actors.

The core group of *JS* performers holds workshops with the satellite teams that “become a sociology class, where actors prepare for the dialogue they will have to invent when the spect-actors come onto the stage” (Ganguly 2017, 91). Influenced by Boal, Ganguly views workshops and the process of making the plays with members of the community as at least as important as the performances (Ganguly 2017, 91-95). *JS* makes possible an “intellectual journey” to lead people to understand and fight against oppression.

After two or three scenes with spect-actors, the audience is likely to become aware of the strings that move the oppression and to see “a vision of the world *as it could be*” (Boal

2002, 243). The first part of a performance might last only 20 minutes; the second part can last 2 or 3 hours (Ganguly 2010, 4), as each spect-actor adds a new dimension to the argument or suggests new questions, and participants and the audience step out of the pretense of the story to discuss the meaning of the story, standards of behavior, and turns of the plot in the rescripted scenes. The interaction is like a game:

The game is spect-actors—trying to find a new solution, trying to change the world—against actors—trying to hold them back, to force them to accept the world as it is. But of course the aim of the forum is not to win, but to learn and to train [the spect-actors]...for ‘real life’ action...[to] learn the arsenal of the oppressors and the possible tactics and strategies of the oppressed (Boal 2002, 244).

To see how the first part of a performance motivates the audience to think of ways to reduce oppression, we give one example of a *JS* play. In *The Brick Factory* (Ganguly 2009), the factory owner promises overtime pay to induce workers to stay at work until they complete a large sales order for bricks. When they have completed it, a worker named Phulmoni demands the overtime pay. The owner refuses. Later in the evening, the owner comes to her home to demand sex. When she refuses to continue the sexual relationship she had had with him earlier in exchange for loans to her husband, he threatens to have him jailed if he does not repay the loans that very evening. She gives in to the factory owner’s demand for sex. Her husband comes home and discovers her in the arms of the factory owner. In the next scene, a court of the village finds her guilty of dishonoring it by adultery and punishes her by caning. At the end of the play, two actors, who had earlier made no move to help Phulmoni, speak to the audience:

First Person: Hunger caused Phulmoni to go to work to the city. Taking advantage of her poverty, the owner forced himself on her. Phulmoni was judged guilty.

Second Person: But actually, the owner is the guilty one. Who will punish him?

Between scenes of a play, actors use their own bodies as ‘clay’ to create human sculptures—frozen images that represent internal or external oppression. This is Image theater.

B. Mechanisms to Foster Social Change

To stimulate engagement and critical thinking and reduce adherence to harmful norms,

community-based Forum theater has three mechanisms that edutainment does not: (i) Members of the audience go onstage to initiate with the actors struggles for the liberation of oppressed individuals. Yarrow (2012) describes this as “performing agency.” (ii) There is an *interactive process of reframing* situations of oppression among actors, spect-actors, and the audience. (iii) The plays *address local problems*, sometimes in real time. We discuss each mechanism, in turn.

Performing agency. Sociologists have long argued that social structures exist, in part, through our routinized and habitual practice of the behaviors of daily life. A pattern of abuse between spouses creates a *status quo* that becomes hard to break out of. To change society, individuals must not only think differently, they must also practice *acting* differently (Bourdieu 1977). From this perspective, Theater of the Oppressed provides a learning and practicing environment. It allows community members not only to imagine new ways of relating and to discuss them, but also to *rehearse* them. Individuals see the effect of new strategies almost immediately after a spect-actor tries them out onstage. This may bolster courage and effort in adopting new behaviors. Experiments in psychology show that actively constructing images of a hypothetical event that one understands leads a person to judge it to be more likely to occur; such thoughts alter later judgments and behavior (Sherman *et al.* 1985).

It is especially important for women to have the experience of performing onstage and/or seeing their peers do it, since women in rural India are trained from childhood not to argue or be assertive. Acting assertively onstage increases one’s ability to be assertive offstage (Lillard 2002, 201).⁶ Experiments show that a person primed with a sense of power generates ideas and expresses attitudes that are less influenced by those of other people (Galinsky *et al.* 2008). The chronic experience of powerlessness among women in strongly patriarchal societies

⁶ Ganguly adopted Forum theater after several years of performing political theater in West Bengal because he concluded that unless the audience actively explored new strategies—which psychologists call “pretend-play”—theater could not change the ideology or practice of patriarchy (Ganguly 2017, 93-94). Passive observation of stories created by outsiders was not enough.

may explain the high proportion of women in many low-income countries who believe that wife beating can be legitimate (Table A-1).

Social reframing. In the second part of a performance, as discussed above, the spect-actors and actors together rescript and reframe the problems depicted in the first part. The audience responds. Individuals who go onstage as spect-actors may get social validation from the actors and/or the audience. Theater becomes an instrument of cultural negotiation. It is more egalitarian than group deliberation (Heller and Rao 2015), since low education is no bar to communicating onstage through actions and movement. (The link of a video that illustrates a negotiation onstage between a spect-actor and the other actors is www.ctrpfp.ac.in.)

Forum theater is a tool for negotiating social change for several reasons. The questioning of actors playing the roles of oppressors, as well as the rehearsal of social change by members of the audience, makes people more aware of the reasons why they act as they do and of alternative ways people could behave. Forum theater is a context in which the patriarchal norms that impose silence on women (Derné 1994a, b; Chowdhry 2015) are suspended, making possible an exchange of ideas about gender roles.

Forum theater also gives people a reason to question the social system.⁷ It may make men see, perhaps for the first time, the cruelty of domestic abuse. After encountering at a bus stop the leading actress in the play he had just seen, a spectator started crying and promised her, “*Didi* (sister), I will not beat my wife again. I beat her quite often. When you were crying after being beaten by your husband in the play, I remembered my wife. She cries exactly like that when I beat her” (Ganguly 2010, 30). The husband could no longer interpret his actions through the story skeleton of ‘masculine man beats disobedient wife’; *JS* had shifted the focus of his attention to his wife’s suffering.

⁷ DiMaggio (1997, 271-272) emphasizes that such motivation is needed.

Psychologists and cognitive scientists believe that the problem-solving strategies used in the domain of spousal relations and violence, as well as in a vast number of other situations, are *domain-specific* (Tooby and Cosmides 1992). Thus, learning to think critically about one set of topics, such as corruption (a theme of some *JS* plays) does not mean that the individual can bring more problem-solving strategies to bear in a different domain, such as domestic violence. Experimental results show that *humans do not have a general-purpose ability to think critically* (Wason 1966; Gigerenzer and Hug 1992). These results suggest that community exposure to plays on topics unrelated to domestic violence would not improve critical thinking about domestic violence.

Focus on local problems. Many *JS* plays are made in response to specific local issues. Members of the community help script them. For instance, *JS* wrote and performed a play on rape in response to an incident where neighbors, despite knowing that a rape was occurring, did not take any action (Ganguly 2017, 94). A play is generally repeated in the same location within 1-3 months (Yarrow, 2017, 31). In repeat performances, a play may be adapted to take account of intervening action in the village or with the authorities, which makes the atmosphere more risky, energized, and engaging for the audience.

III. Survey Design

We drew our sample of treatment villages, as we describe in the next paragraph, from the list provided by *JS* of all villages where it has performed for at least 10 years. From the mid-1990s to date, *JS* has regularly performed only in three blocks of the state of West Bengal—Kakdweep, Kulpi, and Patharpratima. We randomly sampled “control villages” (villages never exposed to *JS*) from three other blocks, Mathurapur I and II and Joynagar II, selected because their demographics and access to public services were similar to those of the treatment blocks in 1991 (see Table 1). (The 1991 Census of India is the census that

immediately precedes the period in which *JS* began performing Forum theater.) The treatment and control villages are in the district of South 24 Parganas. It is part of the Sundarbans delta (see Figure 1).

Our target population is married female village residents between 18 and 49 years of age and their husbands. To select them, we used stratified random sampling:

— From each of the six blocks, we randomly sampled between 1 and 7 *Gram Panchayats* (*GPs*). From each control *GP*, we sampled census villages with probabilities proportional to the 1991 population. From each treated *GP*, we randomly sampled census villages from a list provided by *JS* of the villages where it regularly performs. Figure 1C shows that no control villages in our sample are contiguous to treatment villages, which makes large spillovers of the impact of *JS* between them unlikely.⁸ To the extent that such spillovers occur, our estimates of the impacts of village exposure to *JS* are biased downward.

— From each census village, we randomly sampled either one or two polling booths from the 2014 electoral list. We used this list because a voting card is a proof of identity held by most residents of at least 18 years of age (the minimum voting age).

— From each electoral list we randomly sampled, in the control villages, 15-35 households and, in the treatment villages, 20 households from the active area (electoral booth where plays were performed) and 15 households from the inactive area (where plays were not performed).

Table 1 shows that in 1991, in both treatment and control villages in our sample, most (almost 83 percent) had at least a primary school, but the literacy rate was only about 50

⁸ We used Geospatial data (www.gadm.org) of South 24 Parganas at the village level to check whether proximity of treatment and control villages matters. We grouped treatment villages into two categories based on the median distance between treatment and control villages – distance between control and treatment villages being less than, or greater than, the median distance. If there is any “contamination” bias due to crossovers from control to treatment villages, we expect treatment villages closer to the control villages to have smaller estimated impact of exposure to *JS*. Our estimates show no difference between the two sets of treatment villages, suggesting that a “contamination” bias is not an issue in our sample. Finally, even if there was a “contamination” bias due to crossovers between treatment and control villages, our estimates would be underestimated.

percent. Both sets of villages also showed gender bias (the proportion of females in the population was 48 percent). In our samples, treatment villages compared to control villages had less access to the outside world by road and were more distant from the nearest town. Table 2A shows that our sample is 1,635 couples from 32 treatment villages, and 1,814 couples from 60 control villages.

Implementation of the survey. Field investigators implemented the survey between January 2014 and March 2015. As we explain below, we took great care in designing the survey and its implementation and in training the field investigators to minimize social desirability bias and experimenter demand effects. We conducted two pilot surveys and substantially revised the questionnaire and logistics after the first pilot.

An outsider who visits a village in India becomes an important topic of discussion among the villagers. If asked about the nature of the survey, the field investigators were trained to explain that their purpose was to study the occupational patterns in the village, whether children were attending school regularly, the distance to nearby schools, and other issues covered in the survey that would not be sensitive. The pilot surveys showed that some questions in the survey were sensitive: we observed that visiting the same village over several days created issues in the field, sometimes even violence against the field investigators. Thus, in our actual survey, field investigators always completed the interviews in a village in a single day. To achieve this, teams started the survey early in the morning of each day and had a larger number of investigators in the larger villages. Villages in our sample within walking distance of each other were visited on the same day to reduce the chance that people exchanged information about the survey before taking it. In almost all households, the husband-wife pair were interviewed at approximately the same time by a male and a female field investigator, respectively. This ensured that a person who had taken the survey could not brief the spouse who had not yet taken it or influence what the spouse said. This also made it more likely that a

victim of spousal abuse would speak about it without fear. To maintain privacy, interviews with persons available at home were conducted in a side-room, the kitchen, or even the field.

The field workers were charged with the task of interviewing one married couple in each household. Each investigator was given details (name, gender, age, and the household head's or husband's name) of the members of households to be interviewed and a list of possible replacement households if no eligible married woman was present and willing to participate in the survey. With the help of a family member, on arrival at the household's home, investigators determined whether an eligible married woman was present. If more than one such woman was present, the investigator-team randomly chose one. In only rare cases did an eligible household member refuse to cooperate.

The team sought to interview the husband of the selected female respondent wherever he may have been at the time of the wife's interview. The team achieved this in 99 percent of the cases. For the remaining one percent of the married women, another married man of the same or neighboring household was interviewed. As noted above, the tables in this paper report data only for married couples; including all the data does not qualitatively change any results.

Investigators asked men and women identical questions about their attitudes towards domestic violence, the wife's role in decision making in the household, and whether they knew that domestic violence was against the law. But only the women were asked about acts of domestic abuse.

Before asking questions on any of these topics, the field investigators asked about less emotionally charged topics—primary schooling, the public works program, and other welfare programs in the village. (We do not use this data in this paper.) This order of the questions makes it more likely that respondents would have become comfortable enough with the field investigators to respond without hesitation to questions relating to domestic violence. The last part of the survey in the treatment villages covered *JS*: Had the respondent heard of it?

Watched a *JS* play? If so, when was the last time and how many *JS* performances had the respondent watched? 88 percent of female respondents and 89 percent of male respondents in the treatment villages said that they had heard of *JS*.

The husbands were asked questions on household demographics. Table 2B summarizes their responses. The demographics of control and treatment households were very similar in nearly all respects (male-female ratio, household size, and proportion of households that were nuclear families). The one characteristic where control and treatment households differed substantially was the proportion of illiterate heads of household; it was 15 percent in the control group and only 11 percent in the treatment group. We have controlled for this in our estimations.

To measure village exposure to *JS*, we collated information from *JS*'s records for the 11-year period 2002-2013.⁹ The total number of performances across our sample of treatment villages ranged from 1 to 136. The number of performances of plays on patriarchy and alcohol issues (a major trigger of domestic violence) ranged from 1 to 94, with a median of 25 (see Figure 2). The remainder of the performances were on corruption, land tenure, education, and political violence. Figure 3 shows that either the wife or husband or both in 68 percent of the couples in the treatment group had seen at least one performance of *JS*.¹⁰

We do not use official records of police stations as an additional source of data on domestic violence because the official records are a very imperfect measure of violence against women, both in levels and in trends over time. Recall that the questions on domestic violence in our survey are similar to those in the National Family Health Survey of India (NFHS). According to the 2015-16 NFHS, only 7 percent of the women in West Bengal who have

⁹ As noted above, before 2002, there was no systematic collection of data on the number of performances by *JS* teams.

¹⁰ We believe that the total number of performances viewed is underreported, since the period about which we asked might have extended back as long as 30 years. For completeness, we note, based on the likely underestimated reports from the respondents, that the mean number of viewings for both men and women among the individuals who had seen at least one performance was 2.

experienced physical or sexual violence contacted the police.¹¹ The largest multi-country comparison to date of reporting gender-based violence to formal sources used Demographic Health Surveys to assess bounds on formal sources of data on gender-based violence (Palermo, Bleck, and Peterman 2013). The study found that in India and East Asia, only 2 percent of women of reproductive age who had experienced physical or sexual violence reported it to a formal source. The 2 percent rate for India and East Asia was the lowest rate in the sample for reporting in any region in the world.

IV. Econometric Strategy

As discussed above, *JS* has grown organically over three decades. There was no fixed procedure—neither random nor based on any fixed set of criteria—for selecting the villages in which *JS* teams performed. This creates a challenge for drawing inferences about the impact of *JS*. A standard approach to model an endogenous selection process is instrumental variables. Consider the model where y_1 (outcome) and y_2 (endogenous treatment) are binary variables and suppose,

$$y_1 = 1[z_1\delta_1 + \alpha y_2 + u \geq 0] \quad (1)$$

$$y_2 = 1[z \delta_2 + v \geq 0] \quad (2)$$

where $1[.]$ is the indicator function that takes a value 1 if the inequality in brackets is satisfied and 0, otherwise. In equation (2), the matrix z ($n \times m$) is composed of two sub-matrices z_1 ($n \times m_1$) and z_2 ($n \times m_2$), with $m = m_1 + m_2$. Here z_2 are the set of “exclusion restrictions” used to estimate the impact α of the treatment y_2 on the outcome y_1 . Assuming that the error terms, u and v , are jointly normally distributed with unit variance and that error terms are uncorrelated with anything else of interest, in particular, they satisfy the conditions $E(z'v) = E(z'u) = 0$, it would be tempting to use the two-stage least squares method as follows: (i) use a probit model

¹¹ At the national level, the percentage of victims of domestic violence who contact the police station is only 2.5 percent, which is less than half the level in West Bengal.

of y_2 on z to estimate the fitted probabilities $\widehat{\varphi}_2 = \Phi(z \delta_2)$; (ii) use a probit model of y_1 on z_1 and $\widehat{\varphi}_2$; that is, replace y_2 by $\widehat{\varphi}_2$. However, this is not valid in models with discrete outcome variables and dummy treatment variables unless the expectation operator passes through the nonlinear functions. Estimates using this method are inconsistent. Angrist and Pischke (2008, 190) refer to this approach for dummy endogenous variables as the “forbidden regression” (see also Imbens and Wooldridge 2007).

To avoid the problem of inconsistent estimates, we use joint maximum likelihood estimators (MLE) with bootstrapped standard errors¹² (Wooldridge 2010, 594-599). We estimate a model of triangular form:

Structural equation representing the causal relationship:

$$y_1 = 1 [z_1 \beta_1 + \gamma y_2 + u \geq 0], \quad i = 1, \dots, n \quad (3)$$

Assignment equation for the endogenous treatment:

$$y_2 = 1 [z \widetilde{\beta}_1 + v \geq 0] \quad (4)$$

An example of the binary outcome variable in equation (3) is whether or not a husband has physically abused his wife, where y_1 takes a value 1 if the respondent indicates that her husband has physically abused her and takes a value 0, otherwise. In equation (4), the dependent variable is whether or not *JS* performs in the village where the respondent lives, and the control matrix is $z = [z_1 \quad z_2]$. The error terms u and v are independent of z and distributed as a bivariate normal with mean zero, unit variance.

Identification of the causal relationship using the nonlinearity of the assignment equation without any “exclusion restrictions” is often weak (Angrist and Pischke 2009, 191).

It is desirable that there be at least one variable that can serve as a valid instrument for the

¹² We report unclustered bootstrapped standard errors for two reasons: (i) with only 32 treatment villages the number of clusters is small, and (ii) the model is nonlinear. Kline and Santos (2012) suggest a score-based bootstrap method for complex nonlinear models, but Roodman *et al.* (2019) caution against its use because they argue that score-based bootstrap estimates cannot accurately estimate the parameter distribution for complex nonlinear models.

treatment y_2 in equation (3). As defined earlier, $\mathbf{z} = [z_1 \ z_2]$, where z_2 is a sub-matrix of village-level variables from the 1991 Census of India — population and population density; proportion in the population of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe households, females, workers, agricultural workers, and literates; access in the village to metaled road, bus stop, rail head or navigable waterway, post and telegraph, educational institutions, and medical institutions; and distance to nearest town. We also include all the controls that were used in the structural equation — age and literacy of household head; average education level of females aged 30 years or more; a dummy for Hindu households; the male-female ratio of household members 15-49 years old; three dummy variables if the respondent (a) reads a newspaper, (b) listens to the radio, and (c) watches TV; and distance from the electoral booth to the district headquarters, block headquarters, and *Gram Panchayat* office.

Let $\rho = \text{corr}(u, v)$. We can write the joint distribution of (y_1, y_2) given \mathbf{z} as $f(y_1, y_2 | \mathbf{z}) = f(y_1 | y_2, \mathbf{z})f(y_2 | \mathbf{z})$. Assuming $(y_2 | \mathbf{z}) \sim N(\mathbf{z}\tilde{\boldsymbol{\beta}}, \tau_2^2)$, the conditional density of y_1 given (y_2, \mathbf{z}) is:

$$\Pr(y_1 = 1 | y_2, \mathbf{z}) = \Phi \left[\frac{\{\mathbf{z}_1\beta_1 + \gamma y_2 + (\rho/\tau_2)(y_2 - \mathbf{z}\tilde{\boldsymbol{\beta}})\}}{(1 - \rho^2)^{1/2}} \right] \quad (5)$$

where we define the term in square brackets by w . Then $f(y_1, y_2 | \mathbf{z}) = \Phi(w)^{y_1}(1 - \Phi(w)^{1-y_1})(1/\tau_2)\phi\left(\frac{y_2 - \mathbf{z}\tilde{\boldsymbol{\beta}}}{\tau_2}\right)$. Testing whether the treatment y_2 is exogenous once the MLE is obtained is straightforward by using the null hypothesis $\rho = 0$. For every estimation of the model, we report the value of the correlation. In the majority of cases, the correlation is not significantly different from zero. Where this condition is satisfied, we estimate a non-linear regression model. The results are similar to those obtained from the joint MLE exercise and are reported in the Online Appendix Table 1.

V. Individual Outcomes

We discuss in this section the estimated impacts of exposure of a village to *JS* (γ in equation (3)) on behavior, women’s voice in the household, and attitudes towards domestic violence. The estimates are the “average treatment effects” in the parlance of impact evaluation. In all tables, we also report the estimated mean outcomes in the control villages. We report the p -values in the tables but we have also calculated Anderson’s sharpened q - values (Anderson 2008) for multiple hypothesis testing for false discovery rate corrections *i.e.*, expected proportion of rejections that are Type 1 errors (false rejections). These values are reported in Appendix Table A-2. None of the results is weakened. We observe that the q -values are less than the original p -values.¹³

A. Spousal Abuse and Marital Control

The field investigators asked female respondents about three types of spousal abuse—emotional, physical, and sexual.¹⁴ Table 3 shows that in the control villages, 32 percent of women had been physically abused and 18 percent had been sexually abused; village exposure to *JS* reduced the proportions by 8 percentage points ($p < 0.01$) and 4 percentage points ($p < 0.05$), respectively. In the control villages, 35 percent of women had been emotionally abused, and village exposure to *JS* reduced this by 5 percentage points, but the level of significance is weak in terms of the p -value ($p < 0.1$). Physical and sexual abuse are objectively defined incidents—*e.g.*, hitting, pulling the victim’s hair, twisting the victim’s hand—which the field

¹³ In the *STATA* code provided by Anderson, he notes that sharpened q -values can be less than unadjusted p -values in cases where many hypotheses are rejected, as is true in our case. If there are many true rejections, the false discovery rate is lower with multiple hypothesis tests than with a single hypothesis test.

¹⁴ The definitions are based on the National Family Health Surveys for India. **Emotional abuse**: say or do something to humiliate you in front of others; threaten to hurt or harm you or someone close to you; insult you or make you feel bad about yourself. **Physical abuse**: push you, shake you, or throw something at you; slap you; twist your arm or pull your hair; punch you with his fist or with something that could hurt you; kick you, drag you, or beat you up; try to choke you or burn you on purpose; or threaten or attack you with a knife, gun, or any other weapon. **Sexual abuse**: physically force you to have sexual intercourse with him when you did not want to; physically force you to perform any other sexual acts you did not want to perform; force you with threats or in any other way to perform sexual acts. **Abuse-free**: none of the above forms of abuse occurs.

investigators enumerated for each respondent. In contrast, emotional abuse is more nuanced and may depend on subjective interpretation: humiliating the victim in public, making her feel bad about herself, threatening her or someone close to her with harm. The goal of *JS* is to make people aware of the injustices in their communities and to learn how to put a stop to them. A finding that the impact of *JS* on emotional abuse is only weakly significant could reflect either an objectively small impact of *JS* or a large impact of *JS* on the awareness of self and of emotionally hurtful behavior so that actions that had once seemed well-deserved later seemed abusive.

Taking into account all forms of spousal abuse, village exposure to *JS* increased the proportion of women free of abuse by 13 percentage points ($p < .01$) relative to the proportion of 46 percent in the control villages.

We define marital control to include any of the following: the husband does not permit his wife to meet her female friends, he limits her contact with her family in her natal village¹⁵, and/or he does not trust her with any money. Under this definition, Table 4 (col. 1) shows that in control villages, only 4 percent of married women are free of marital control. Exposure of a village to *JS* more than doubled this proportion ($p < .01$), but still it remained very low, at 9 percent.

Alcohol abuse has high social costs. The World Health Organization (2014) estimates that among all countries for which it has data, India has the highest number of years of life lost due to alcohol consumption. Excessive alcohol consumption is a major cause of domestic violence. Luca, Owens, and Sharma (2015) estimate that the prohibition of alcohol sales, which occurred during some periods between 1990 and 2020 in six Indian states (but not in West Bengal), is associated with a 50 percent reduction in the likelihood that a husband beats his

¹⁵ In North India including West Bengal, Hindu marriage is exogamous for women. Hindu women leave their natal villages to marry into families in distant villages (Bhalotra *et al.* 2019).

wife. In some *JS* plays the burden on families of excessive alcohol consumption is a central theme. To assess who would be categorized as a “drinker,” field investigators asked each female respondent whether her husband regularly consumed alcohol. This proportion was 32 percent in the control villages (see Table 4, col. 4). Village exposure to *JS* reduced the proportion by 5 percentage points ($p < 0.01$).

We examine the impact of village exposure to *JS* on alcohol-related violence in two ways: (i) we estimate the impact on all couples; (ii) we also estimate the impact under the condition that the husband was a “drinker.” Both wives and their husbands were asked, “Were there episodes of verbal and/or physical abuse because of the husband’s consumption of alcohol?” The women and their husbands in both the treatment and control groups said that verbal or physical abuse due to the husband’s drinking was a common problem. The responses indicate that in both the full sample and the subsample of regular drinkers, village exposure to *JS* significantly reduced the problem. In the subsample of couples where the husbands were drinkers, village exposure to *JS* reduced the proportion of abuse due to drinking by 23 percentage points ($p < 0.01$) relative to the proportion of such abuse of 36 percent in the control (according to the women’s responses). The husbands’ responses also indicate a 60 percent reduction in the proportion of abuse related to drinking, but the absolute values of the proportions are larger: the proportion of husbands who indicated that drinking led them to abuse their wives was 47 percent in the control villages and was reduced by 28 percentage points ($p < 0.01$) in the treatment villages. The pair-wise correlation between spouses’ responses on whether drinking led a husband to abuse his wife is substantial at 0.32.

B. Wives’ Voice in Decision Making in Their Households

The finding that village exposure to *JS* reduced domestic abuse suggests that exposure led people to question the ideology of patriarchy. One way to assess this is to examine whether wives in treatment villages were allowed a greater role in making decisions about their lives

and their households. This is a valid measure of the impact on the ideology of patriarchy because *JS* plays are about pivotal life events; they are not about day-to-day household decision making. Thus, if in day-to-day decision making, a wife has greater voice, it is not because of priming by *JS*. Instead, it may be because the appropriate role of a wife is seen differently.

Field investigators asked each female respondent and, separately, her husband whether she participated with him in making decisions in seven domains : education of the children, family health care, major household purchases, her visits to her relatives, the children's marriages, number of children to bear, and use of contraception. Table 5 reports two summary measures – (i) whether the wife participated in *all* seven domains, and (ii) whether she participated in *none* of them. We characterize a wife who participated in none of these decisions as “voiceless.” The Online Appendix Tables 2A and 2B report components of the summary measures.

Exposure of a village to *JS* significantly increased wives' voice in their households. Consider first the responses of the wives (cols. 1 and 3 of Table 5). Relative to the proportion of 6 percent in the control villages, village exposure to *JS* increased by 4 percentage points ($p < .01$) the proportion of self-reports that she participated in decision making over all seven issues covered by the survey. Village exposure also reduced by 12 percentage points ($p < .01$) relative to the proportion of 21 percent in the control villages the proportion of wives' who had no voice in any household decision making.

Not surprisingly, most husbands believed that their wives had a larger role in decision making than their wives did. The pair-wise correlation between the beliefs of a wife and her husband that they shared in decision making on all seven issues is only 0.095. The pair-wise correlation in their beliefs that the wife is voiceless is zero (it is 0.028). Nonetheless, both the wives' and husbands' responses show a strong positive impact of *JS* on women's voice. This suggests that in treatment villages compared to control villages, joint decision making between

women and their husbands becomes more frequent and a husband becomes more likely to defer to his wife's judgment, but that the wife does not express disagreement on many issues since she believes it would be too costly. This often allows the husband to believe that she agrees with him when she does not.

C. Attitudes Towards Domestic Violence

Field investigators asked husbands and wives whether a husband was justified to hit or beat his wife under seven circumstances: she (i) goes out without telling her husband, (ii) neglects the children and household work, (iii) argues with her husband, (iv) refuses to have sex with him, (v) disrespects her in-laws, (vi) is suspected of having an illicit relationship, and (vii) has borne no male child. Table 6 reports the results. In the control group, less than 8 percent of women said that beating was justified in any of these seven situations, and the impact of *JS* is not statistically significant. In contrast, in the control group a whopping 57 percent of husbands said that wife beating was acceptable for at least one reason. Exposure of a village to *JS* reduced this proportion by 31 percentage points ($p < .01$).¹⁶

Based on the two evaluations to date of edutainment, discussed in Section I, *JS* has been more effective than edutainment in changing men's attitudes towards domestic violence. (We focus here on *MTV Shuga* because it was the more successful of the two edutainment interventions and the outcomes that were evaluated for *Shuga* overlap more closely with the outcomes we study for *JS*.) Compared to *Shuga*, *JS* had a larger impact on men's attitudes toward domestic violence. As noted in the preceding paragraph, *JS* reduced the proportion of men who believed that domestic violence can be justifiable by 31 percentage points, which is more than a 50 percent reduction, but *Shuga* reduced the proportion by only 6 percentage

¹⁶ We also estimated the impact of *JS* using a Poisson model, as in Banerjee *et. al.* (2019b), in which the outcome is a count of the situations that the respondent believed justify domestic violence. On average, women in the control group believed that there were *no* reasons that justified hitting one's wife. For men, the average number of reasons wife was close to one. Village exposure to *JS* significantly reduced for men the number of reasons that justified hitting one's wife.

points, which is a 21 percent reduction. The much greater impact of *JS* than *Shuga* is despite the fact that direct exposure of an individual to *JS* was smaller than direct exposure to *Shuga*: in only 67 percent of couples in treated villages did at least one person see any *JS* play. But every participant in the treatment group in *Shuga* saw eight 22-minute episodes.

D. Community Reporting of Domestic Violence and Willingness to Help Demolish Illegal Liquor Shops

The enforcement of laws depends on cooperation from community members. Our survey asked respondents if they would report *to anyone* acts of domestic violence that they witnessed (see Table 7, cols. 1-2). Village exposure to *JS* made almost universal the willingness to bear witness to someone: *JS* increased by 12 percentage points ($p < .01$) the proportion of women willing to bear witness relative to the proportion of 85 percent in the control villages, and it increased it among men by 7 percentage points ($p < .01$) relative to the proportion of 91 percent in the control villages. The nearly universal willingness in the treatment villages is consistent with the results in the next subsection that suggest that *JS* changed village norms—it made wife beating no longer a normal way to behave.

But a change in patriarchal village norms does not imply a change society-wide, in particular, among the police. Less than 3 percent of both female and male respondents to our survey said that they would register a complaint at the local police station about an incident of domestic violence that they witnessed. (Instead, they would report it to a neighbor, the victim's parents, or her in-laws.) In the North Indian state of Bihar, Amaral *et al.* (2020) find that “[a]lmost all the male police officers we met at the station level dismissed domestic violence cases, saying that women just came whenever ‘anything tiny’ happened, and ‘they just wanted more control over their husbands and marital families’.” Through the cultural lens of patriarchy, the police did not see domestic violence as a crime, in spite of its criminalization by law in India since 2006. Amaral and colleagues are implementing a randomized controlled

trial to assess whether Theater of the Oppressed can change police attitudes towards domestic violence.

We asked our respondents a second question about informal enforcement: “If there was an illegal liquor shop in your community, would you participate in demolishing it?” (See Table 7, cols. 3-4.) Village exposure to *JS* increased the proportion of women who were willing to help demolish an illegal liquor shop by 15 percentage points ($p < .01$) relative to the proportion of 50 percent in control villages. Among men, village exposure to *JS* increased the proportion by 20 percentage points ($p < .01$) relative to the proportion of 71 percent in the control villages.

E. Awareness that Domestic Violence Is Against the Law

In 2006, India prohibited domestic violence for the first time. The new law gives a female victim the right to file a police report and receive compensation from her in-laws for health expenses related to the abuse. The law bars the husband and in-laws from evicting her from the marital home. Many *JS* plays refer to women’s rights under the 2006 law. The core *JS* team instructs the satellite teams to mention them whenever relevant in the interactive sessions with the audience.

Table 8 shows that in the control villages, only 51 percent of men and women are aware of women’s new legal rights. Village exposure to *JS* increased awareness by 6 and 12 percentage points ($p < .01$), respectively, among men and women.

A potential threat to the validity of the above results is a social desirability bias. Survey respondents may tend to answer questions in a manner that over-reports behavior and attitudes that they believe are viewed as desirable. Similarly, they may underreport behavior and attitudes that they believe are viewed as undesirable. We check this by estimating impacts on variables that we do not expect village exposure to *JS* plays to affect. The variables that we consider concern trust. We assess whether the respondents depend on their neighbors, friends

and relatives, and community in times of need. Table 9 shows that village exposure to *JS* did not have any significant impact on any of these variables.

F. Interaction with Head of Household's Education

Especially in rural areas, lines of hierarchy and authority are clearly drawn in an Indian household: the social norm is that family members accept the authority of the head of household. To investigate whether the impact of *JS* depends on the level of his education, we disaggregate households between those with a household head with no formal education (24 percent), up to primary school (33 percent), and beyond primary school (43 percent). Appendix Table A-3 reports the results on the impact of *JS* on the proportion of abuse-free couples, on whether a wife has voice in household decision making, and on awareness of legal protections for victims of domestic violence.

In households with an uneducated head, fewer couples were abuse-free (44 percent compared to 51-53 percent), but the impact of *JS* on the proportion of abuse-free couples was similar across all groups—a 9-12 percentage point increase. (There is no statistical difference.)

In all three groups of households, the percentage of households unaware of legal protections for victims of domestic violence was 47-57 percent, with awareness increasing in the household head's education. But again, the impact of village exposure to *JS* was not significantly different across these three groups. For all three groups, the proportion who became aware increased by 10 -14 percentage points.

VI. Changes in Village Norms

An overarching goal of *JS* is to change patriarchal norms. To assess whether *JS* met this goal, we investigate *spillovers* of its impact within villages and the *persistence* of its impact. Recall that 8 percent more couples living in active areas (where *JS* performs) have viewed at least one *JS* performance than couples living in inactive areas (where *JS* does not

perform). To assess spillover effects within a village exposed to *JS*, we compare the impact on couples who live in the active area of their village to the impact on couples who live in the inactive areas. Table 10 shows that *JS* substantially improved the position of women in both active and inactive areas, with no significant difference between the two impacts.

We next consider the persistence of the impact of village exposure to *JS* performances. We compare treatment villages with, and without, a *JS* performance of plays on patriarchy or alcohol issues in the four years preceding the survey (see Table 11). In treatment villages *with no* recent performances on these themes, the reductions in spousal abuse, in “voiceless” wives, and in the proportion of wives’ with no knowledge of the legal protections to the victims of domestic violence were highly significant ($p < .01$). This indicates that village exposure to *JS* plays had persistent effects on behavior and knowledge.

Particularly suggestive evidence that *JS* changed village norms would be a finding that village exposure to *JS* changed behavior and attitudes of couples in a treatment village who have never watched a *JS* performance. Since watching a *JS* performance is endogenous and would likely be correlated with openness to change in gender roles, a simple comparison of the behavior of viewers and non-viewers cannot establish cause and effect. We use a difference-in-differences method. The first difference is between couples who chose and couples who did not choose to watch at least one *JS* performance. We compare this difference across two sets of villages: villages with, and without, exposure within the four years preceding the survey to a *JS* play on patriarchy or alcohol issues. We would predict *no* significant difference if *JS* changed village norms: attitudes of people in a village about the appropriate way to behave would be shared collectively. If, however, *JS* did *not* change village norms, we would predict a *larger* absolute difference between viewers and non-viewers in villages *with* recent performances on patriarchy or alcohol issues than in villages *without* recent performances.

Table 12 reports the impact of *JS* on three indicators (domestic abuse, voice, and

awareness of legal protection for victims of domestic violence) for couples disaggregated by whether or not they have watched a *JS* performance¹⁷ and whether or not *JS* has performed a play on patriarchy or alcohol issues in the four years preceding the survey. With two exceptions (that are only weakly significant), there is no statistically significant difference in impacts whether or not respondents have watched a *JS* performance. The overall pattern of results suggests that the new ideas expressed in *JS* performances, and the new gender roles rehearsed, have spread through village networks and changed village norms.

Another way to test whether *JS* changed the social norms of a village is to compare the estimated impacts on younger and on older women in the sample. The median age of female respondents in the sample is 30 years. Using this as the cutoff, we compare the impact of village exposure to *JS* on female respondents between 18 and 29 years with the impact on respondents between 30 and 49 years. We report this for three different outcomes: abuse-free relationship with the husband, no participation in decision making in the household, and willingness to report an incident of domestic violence that was witnessed. We find no difference in the impacts between the two cohorts of female respondents even though, presumably, the older cohorts have been exposed to *JS* for a longer period of time (Table 13).

Figure 4 summarizes the impact of village exposure to *JS*. Although there was only a modest increase in the proportion of villagers aware of the disincentives under the law for abusing a wife, village exposure to *JS* substantially reduced physical and sexual abuse. It also increased wives' role in household decision making, it led more men and women to take community action to protect women by reporting abuse and demolishing illegal liquor shops. This is evidence that village exposure *JS* changed the macho mentality.

¹⁷ The qualitative results are unchanged if the category of "either husband or wife has watched a performance" are subdivided into the finer categories of "husband has watched a play, but not wife" and "wife has watched a play, but not husband." We chose the more parsimonious model.

VII. A Simple Model of Adherence to Norms of Patriarchy

In light of the evidence discussed above of the common representation of masculinity as toughness towards a wife and the widespread acceptability of domestic violence, we present a model in which social norms embedded in these values may sustain widespread domestic violence. Comparative statics of our model can show when community-based participatory theater can play a bigger role than *edutainment* in reducing domestic violence. If social sanctions to a husband from violating patriarchal norms are high, if men are afraid to question prevailing patriarchal norms with other men for fear of appearing weak, if some women have internalized the norms of patriarchy and thus do not impose costs on oppressive husbands by denying them love, if discussion between husbands and wives about their feelings is itself a violation of a norm, we would expect participatory theater to be a more effective means than *edutainment* to reduce domestic violence and empower women. The basic reason is that to change a deeply held norm, a collective process of engagement and discussion is needed.

The motivation for the model is the observation that irrespective of their tastes, most men in many communities in India want to follow patriarchal norms: they feel strong social pressure to do so and fear sanctions for transgression (*e.g.*, Derné 1994a, b; Chowdhry 2015). Being seen to violate the patriarchal norms changes relations with uninvolved parties in subsequent transactions. As one urban merchant in India said, “Whatever the social restrictions are, if [a woman] does not live according to them, the honor [*izzat*] of her family [*ghar*] is finished,” with consequences for the family’s social status and business opportunities and the children’s marriage prospects (Derné 1994b, 209). Fear of sanctions leads some married couples to disguise the nature of their relationships, as in the case of Yusef and Habiba:

They relate to each other in ways that are at odds with the normal pattern of interaction between the two sexes in the village. Yusef can be seen at times helping with household chores or chatting with Habiba in the evening as if she were his friend....Yusef is careful not to flaunt their relationship in the village. When Yusef is helping to clean the house or

doing other ‘women’s work,’ they close the shutters and lock the door.¹⁸

The agents in the model are the married men in a community. They are indexed by j on the continuum of the unit interval. Each agent makes a binary decision whether or not to practice patriarchal norms. The payoff to an agent j has two parts. The first part is his intrinsic utility payoff v_j^A if he allows his wife some autonomy (violating the patriarchal norms), or v_j^P if he exercises full control over her. The second part is the utility cost, denoted C , of the social sanctions he suffers if he violates the patriarchal norms by giving his wife some autonomy. The utility cost is assumed to be the same across agents.

Let $\Delta_j = v_j^A - v_j^P$ define agent j ’s differential in intrinsic utility between a strictly patriarchal relationship with his wife and a relationship in which his wife has some autonomy. The cumulative distribution of Δ is the continuous function $F(\Delta)$. If an agent I is indifferent between following and not following the patriarchal norms, then (i) $C = \Delta_I$, (ii) the fraction of agents who follow the norms is $F(\Delta_I)$, and (iii) the set of agents who do not follow the norms is $\{\Delta \mid \Delta > \Delta_I\}$. Husbands for whom $0 < \Delta \leq \Delta_I$ follow the norms even though, if there were no social sanctions for norm violations, they would prefer not to; none of them, by behaving differently, could make himself better off. We make the simplifying assumption that the utility cost of being sanctioned is a proportion $\alpha \in (0,1]$ of the measure of agents who follow the patriarchal norms, which implies, using property (ii), that $C = \alpha F(\Delta_I)$.¹⁹

The assumption that the incentive to follow the patriarchal norms is increasing in the

¹⁸ Dandekar (1986, 94). The example describes a couple in the 1980s in one of the most socially advanced states of India (Maharashtra). Similar social pressures exist in our survey area. In 2015-16, the difference in gender relations between rural Maharashtra and rural West Bengal is suggested by the difference in domestic violence: the percentage of ever-married women age 15 to 49 who had experienced spousal violence was 37 percent in rural West Bengal and only 26 percent in rural Maharashtra (Source: National Family Health Survey 2015-16, International Institute for Population Sciences and ICF, 2017).

¹⁹ Norm followers’ punishment of norm transgressors can be modelled as an equilibrium outcome. Folk Theorem results show that social norms can create incentives where not only deviators from the desired behavior are punished, but also persons who fail to punish the deviators are punished. These incentives can sustain a norm under a local information system regardless of individuals’ tastes for punishing transgressors and their tastes for observance of the norm (Akerlof 1976, 36-43; Kandori 1992). In that case, the parameter α is the marginal increase in the incentive to follow the norm as the measure of norm followers increases.

proportion of norm followers (*i.e.*, the players' decisions are *strategic complements*) means that the environment may harbor more than one Nash equilibrium. If there are multiple equilibria, which equilibrium is attained depends on the beliefs that people have held at some point in the past and on the way they revise their beliefs.

Strategic complementarities capture an important real-world element. For example, in Western countries, there is a prescriptive norm that men wear a necktie to formal events. But if many men do not wear a necktie to a particular event, the social cost of not wearing it is likely to be small, and the meaning of wearing a necktie at the event is likely to change.

Equilibrium compliance with the patriarchal norms is defined by any value of Δ such that $\alpha F(\Delta) = \Delta$, that is, a value at which the utility cost of sanctions to the marginal violator equals his utility gain from violating the norms. An equilibrium is stable if in a neighborhood of the equilibrium, for all values of Δ less than the equilibrium value, $\alpha F(\Delta) > \Delta$, and for all values of Δ more than the equilibrium value, $\alpha F(\Delta) < \Delta$.

In Figure 5, the gain Δ from violating the norms and the cost imposed on norm violators, $\alpha F(\Delta)$, are equal at the intersection of the curve $\alpha F(\Delta)$ and the 45-degree line from the origin. The figure illustrates the case of three equilibria in the set of agents who conform to the patriarchal norms. R is an unstable equilibrium, Q and S are stable equilibria, and Q (with the lower proportion of agents who practice the patriarchy norms) is Pareto superior.

We use this simple model to show that community exposure to *JS* may change a social outcome through two channels—impulses and preferences. To see the role of impulses, suppose that the community is initially at equilibrium S . Viewers of *JS* performances and those in their social networks who observe around them changes in attitudes and behavior, as well as the consequences of those changes, may develop new instincts that lead them to shrink back from sanctioning men who allow their wives some autonomy. Agents use the observation of

their own impulses to form a belief about other agents' impulses. Kets and Sandroni (forthcoming) show that in coordination games, any conflict between impulsive reactions and reasoned responses can be resolved: after sufficiently many steps of reasoning, the process converges to an *introspective equilibrium*. Figure 6 illustrates two cases starting from equilibrium S . In one case, the impulse is large (\hat{p}), and the introspective equilibrium selects the Pareto superior Nash equilibrium Q . In the other case, the impulse is small (\tilde{p}), and the introspective equilibrium selects the Pareto inferior Nash equilibrium. As in the analysis in Greif (1994), culture “selects” the equilibrium outcome. Greif considers the case in which differences in history produce distinct cultures. We consider the case in which long-run exposure to participatory theater produces a change in culture.

Besides affecting equilibrium selection, JS may also change payoffs v_j^A and v_j^P by changing either deep values or what a husband perceives as a challenge to, or an expression of, his manhood. “A situation can be interpreted and categorized in several ways, with very different consequences for norm compliance,” as Bicchieri (2006, *xi*) notes. Village exposure to JS may reframe domestic violence by shifting the focus of attention from the manhood of the assailant to the harm to the victim. The young husband quoted in Section II who promised never to beat his wife again is an instance where a JS performance led a frequent wife-abuser to focus for the first time on the pain that he caused his wife. Shifting attention to the suffering of victims of domestic violence also raises self-image concerns (Bénabou, Falk and Tirole 2018). Discussions in the second part of a JS performance of a play on the theme of patriarchy would normally include arguments that a man who beats his wife is behaving like a bad man. The change in framing implies a shift in the distribution, $F(\Delta)$, of preferences to grant one's wife a measure of autonomy. Figure 7 illustrates a downward shift to $G(\Delta) \leq F(\Delta)$ for all Δ . As illustrated in the figure, a large enough shift from a stable initial equilibrium induces a unique equilibrium with low conformity to the patriarchal norms.

In this simple model, husbands are the drivers of change and the community costlessly assigns an observable reputational label to each husband. There are two additional channels through which *JS* is likely to change social outcomes. By increasing women's self-confidence and their resistance to oppression, as discussed in Section II, village exposure to *JS* may change men's attitudes and impulses. By creating a context in which members of a community share ideas about gender norms, village exposure to *JS* may correct possibly exaggerated beliefs among husbands about the proportion of men who practice patriarchal norms and who would sanction men who do not. (Evidence of such a large misperception in Saudi Arabia is in Bursztyn, Gonzalez, and Yanagizawa-Drott 2020.)

VIII. Conclusion

The belief that domestic violence is a husband's right and shows a husband's manhood is entrenched in many communities in low- and lower middle-income countries. This mentality makes it impossible for legal prohibition to stop widespread domestic violence. This paper presents the first large-scale evidence that community-based Theater of the Oppressed can have a large effect on domestic violence and on its social acceptability. *JS* equipped villagers with new stories, impulses, and critical thinking skills to question the ideology of patriarchy. The first part of a *JS* performance presents a play that makes people spectators of their own actions in real life. In the second part, volunteers from the audience intervene; they change the definition of the oppressive situation presented in the first part and rehearse ways to end the oppression.

Using an endogenous treatment model, we estimated that village exposure to *JS* for at least 10 years substantially increased the proportion of abuse-free marriages, sharply decreased alcohol-related domestic abuse, and increased wives' role in decision making in their households. Village exposure to *JS* had a deep and persistent impact on relationships between

husbands and wives. We find evidence of both spillover effects within a village and the durability of the impacts.

The “‘scaffolds’ on which institutional structures rest” are beliefs that people hold to be true and reasonable (Greif and Mokyr 2017, 26). *JS*’s central goal can be expressed in these terms: to foster the critical thinking that permits people to dismantle the scaffolds that support patriarchy. By motivating individuals to rescript and expressively sustain a new definition of oppressive situations, *JS* weakens the feedback loop through which patriarchy shapes the representation of masculinity as toughness towards women, which influences individual behaviors, which, in aggregate, reproduce patriarchy.

Future research should experiment with ways to scale up elements of participatory theater. Many questions loom large: What part of the performances could be videotaped and shown as movies rather than performed live? What other social meanings –such as those that underpin the tolerance of corruption, the abuse of low-status groups, corporal punishment of children, and sexism in the workplace—could Theater of the Oppressed change?

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Synopsis of three JS plays on patriarchy and alcohol issues

***Shonar Meye* (Golden Girl)**

The play addresses the plight of young women in India. It portrays the life of a girl from childhood to adulthood. The writing of *Shonar Meye* was a result of five years of intensive work in remote areas of the Sunderbans in West Bengal. At this time JS conducted theatre workshops with many groups of villagers. The play *Shonar Meye* is based on the discussions at these workshops in which individuals shared their experiences of oppression and their daily challenges. Though it was written almost 15 years ago, it remains an extremely relevant play today.

In the play, Ram *babu* is a middle-class villager who lives with his wife, son, and daughter. Ram *babu* favors his son over his daughter because he believes that his son will look after him and his wife in their old age but his daughter will get married and leave for her in-laws' home. His daughter wants to study but her family will not support her education. The family makes her spend most of her time on daily household chores.

Before marriage, prospective in-laws inspect the girl to check whether she is physically suitable to marry their son. The girl passes the inspection, and Ram *babu* arranges for his daughter to marry the handsome son of a well-to-do family. The groom's family demand a dowry of 10,000 rupees and 110 grams of gold. They ask Ram *babu* to arrange the demanded dowry by the time of the marriage.

Ram *babu* decides to sell off his land and take a bank loan for the marriage, but he fails to pay the in-laws the dowry by the time of the marriage. The groom's father threatens that Ram *babu* and his family will not be able to see their daughter again until he satisfies all their demands. The daughter faces the wrath of her husband's parents because of her father's inability to meet the dowry demands. She has to work very hard. If she makes even a small

mistake, she is tortured unspeakably. The play ends when the oppressed character confronts her oppressors.

Ekti Meyer Kahini (Story of a Girl)

This is another play that depicts the different stages in the lives of women: the period before marriage, marriage, and life after marriage. The first part highlights gender inequality. Sankari, the protagonist, is a teenage daughter of a poor agricultural worker. She has an elder brother who is married. Sankari wants to study, but because of her family's poverty she is unable to do so. Her brother and sister-in-law want her to get married and leave for her in-laws' house as soon as possible.

The second part of the play showcases dowry-related problems and the lack of choice that Sankari has about when and whom to marry. Sankari's father pays a hefty dowry at the time of her marriage.


The last part of the play focuses on the ill-effects of early marriage on young girls (13-14 years old) and how the central characters of the family (the mother-in-law and husband) become tools of oppression. As punishment for mistakes she made doing household chores, Sankari is sent back to her natal family to bring money to meet the medical expenses incurred by her in-laws when she fell sick. At her father's house, the situation is no better: her brother and sister-in-law torture her and put pressure on her father and on her to go back to her in-laws' house. Sankari knows that if she returns to her husband's home without the money demanded by her in-laws, she would be killed. The play ends as she sees her dilemma – whether to return to her husband's home or stay at her father's home and try and earn a living for herself.

Hay re mod (The Curse of Alcohol)

In early 2005, JS organized a sit-in protest against the illegal production and sale of liquor in their region. Villagers blocked the main highway that connects Kolkata to the Sundarbans area. This was the start of an anti-liquor campaign in these areas. There is a strong nexus between politicians, illegal liquor shop owners, local government officials, and the police. Prasad Sarkar, one of the protesters, explained the cause of the protest to the police in these words: “You are spineless policemen. You find our work illegal [*i.e.*, blocking the highway], and you don’t notice (*chokhe pore na*) the illegal production of liquor because it is in your self-interest” (Da Costa 2010). Women and adolescent children bear the brunt of the consequences of alcohol abuse in the form of increased domestic violence and withdrawal from schools due to the shortage of funds.

In the play *Hay Re Mod (The Curse of Alcohol)*, Naina has two school-going sons and two married brothers-in-law. Naina’s husband is a drunkard. Her husband spends all his earnings on alcohol and contributes nothing to run the household or to buy books and school supplies for their sons. She also has to, from time to time, borrow from her neighbors and do odd jobs outside the household. When Naina asks him for money, he becomes violent and mercilessly beats her. Naina complains to the head of the village government (the *Panchayat*) and she even goes to the police station to register a complaint. Naina laments that the police “take bribes behind the scenes (*pechon theke ghoosh*), that is why they cannot find a solution to our problems” (Da Costa 2010). The husband’s brothers too plead with him to stop drinking, but their efforts fail, too. The play ends with the brothers’ moving out of the house to live separately from the drunkard and Naina’s taking her husband to a barely functional rural hospital to get him treated for nausea and vomiting, abdominal pain, drowsiness and dizziness – all effects of consuming illicit liquor.


Figure 1: Areas from which the treatment and control samples were drawn




Notes: The highlighted areas show in panel (A) the district of South 24 Parganas, in panel (B) the control and treatment blocks, and in panel (C) the control and treatment villages. The borders demarcate districts, blocks and villages in the three panels, respectively.

Figure 2. Number of JS performances in treatment villages, 2002-2013

A. Total number of performances



B. Number of JS performances on patriarchy and alcohol issues



Note: Borders demarcate villages.

Figure 3. Proportion of married couples in active and inactive areas of a village who have watched at least one JS performance






Figure 4. Summary of the impact of village exposure to JS on spousal abuse, wives' voice, and the acceptability of wife beating

A. Wives' responses



B. Husbands' and wives' responses



Notes: 95 % confidence intervals (light lines) surround the estimated point estimates for the outcomes. Thicker lines between the vertical bars represent ± 1 standard error. The numbers in parentheses adjacent to a dependant variable are the proportions of respondents in the control group who indicate that the dependent variable holds true for them.

Figure 5. Multiple equilibria in the allocation of agents between conformists and non-conformists to the patriarchal norms




Figure 6. Impulses against sanctioning non-conformists, \hat{p} and \tilde{p} , and the introspective equilibria to which they converge




Figure 7. A shift in intrinsic preferences for patriarchy




Table 1. Characteristics of treatment and control villages from Census 1991

	<i>Control</i>	<i>Treatment</i>	<i>Difference in means (p-values)</i>
<i>Demographics (percent of population)</i>			
Females	48.36	48.45	0.690
Children 0-6 years	19.70	21.10	0.001
SC/ST households	44.46	33.46	0.001
Agricultural workers	24.81	25.09	0.489
Literacy	49.77	53.81	0.001
<i>Average distance to nearest town (km)</i>	19.25	35.78	0.000
<i>Percentage of villages with:</i>			
Educational institution	82.57	82.61	0.991
Medical facilities	36.51	42.55	0.147
Drinking water facility	95.85	94.10	0.342
Post, telegraph, telephone facility	30.29	30.75	0.908
Access to 'pucca' road	47.30	18.94	0.000
Access to power supply	51.04	21.12	0.000
Bus stop, rail station, navigable waterway	28.22	38.20	0.012

Source: Census of India, 1991

Table 2A. Number of administrative regions and households in the primary survey

	<i>Control</i>	<i>Treatment</i>
Blocks	3	3
<i>Gram panchayats</i>	18	8
Census villages	60	32
Electoral polling booths	78	87
Households	1,814	1,635 In active areas: 873 In inactive areas: 762

Source: Primary survey, 2014-15

Note. Eligible voters are assigned to a polling booth according to where they live. We distinguish polling booths in the treatment villages that correspond to areas in which *JS* regularly performs (“active areas”) and in which it does not (“inactive areas”).

Table 2B. Characteristics of respondents in the primary survey

	<i>Control</i> (<i>N</i> =1814)	<i>Treatment</i> (<i>N</i> =1635)
Age of female respondents	29.97 (0.16)	30.50 (0.17)
Age of male respondents	35.94 (0.17)	36.73 (0.18)
Number of children	2.06 (0.03)	1.86 (0.03)
Age of household head	40.24 (0.26)	42.73 (0.28)
Household head is illiterate (proportion)	0.15 (0.01)	0.11 (0.01)
Male-female ratio (15-49 years)	1.17 (0.01)	1.17 (0.02)
Household size	5.11 (0.05)	5.10 (0.05)
Respondent’s household is nuclear (proportion)	0.59 (0.12)	0.55 (0.11)

Source: Primary survey, 2014-15

Note. The columns report the mean values except where otherwise noted. Standard errors reported in parentheses.

Table 3. Men's abuse of their wives—Wives' responses

<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>Emotional abuse</i> (1)	<i>Physical abuse</i> (2)	<i>Sexual abuse</i> (3)	<i>Abuse-free</i> (4)
Living in a village exposed to <i>JS</i>	-0.0506* (0.027)	-0.0805*** (0.020)	-0.0439** (0.021)	0.1318*** (0.028)
Mean of control group	0.3506 (0.015)	0.3178 (0.013)	0.1841 (0.013)	0.4585 (0.016)
Log-likelihood	-2560	-2369	-1929	-2733
<i>N</i>	3,443	3,443	3,441	3,441
Correlation between errors of the outcome & assignment equations	-0.1242 (0.087)	0.1363 (0.085)	0.1149 (0.095)	-0.0682 (0.078)

Notes. The dependent variable in cols. (1)-(4) takes a value 1 if a wife faces the abuse mentioned in the column heading. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. Levels of significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.

Table 4. Freedom from marital control, husband's alcohol consumption, and spousal abuse due to husband's drinking

<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>Freedom from marital control</i>	<i>Full sample</i>			<i>Subsample where the husbands drink</i>	
		<i>Verbal or physical abuse due to husband's drinking</i>	<i>Whether husband drinks</i>	<i>Verbal or physical abuse due to husband's drinking</i>		
	<i>Wives' responses</i> (1)	<i>Wives' responses</i> (2)	<i>Husbands' responses</i> (3)	<i>Wives' responses</i> (4)	<i>Wives' responses</i> (5)	<i>Husbands' responses</i> (6)
Living in a village exposed to JS	0.0512*** (0.013)	-0.0398** (0.019)	-0.1184*** (0.026)	-0.0526*** (0.021)	-0.2258*** (0.042)	-0.2805*** (0.050)
Mean of control group	0.0397 (0.005)	0.1250 (0.013)	0.2903 (0.019)	0.3243 (0.013)	0.3630 (0.036)	0.4676 (0.043)
Log-likelihood	-1183	-1449	-2061	-2240	-937	-1167
<i>N</i>	3,404	3,364	3,376	3,352	1,620	1,828
Correlation between errors of t outcome & assignment equatio	0.1060 (0.101)	0.3484*** (0.091)	0.0961 (0.104)	0.1051 (0.076)	0.3679** (0.191)	0.2196 (0.165)

Notes. The dependent variable in col. (1) takes a value 1 if the wife is free from marital control as defined in the text. The dependent variable in cols. (2)-(3) takes a value 1 if the respondent states that there is verbal or physical abuse in the couple's relationship in the past year due to the husband's drinking (estimation sample includes respondents where the husband does not drink). The dependent variable in col. (4) takes a value 1 if the respondent states that her husband regularly drinks alcohol. The dependent variable in cols. (5)-(6) takes a value 1 if the respondent states that there is verbal or physical abuse in the couple's relationship in the past year due to the husband's drinking (sample includes only respondents whose husbands drink). Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. Levels of significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.

Table 5. Wives' participation in making major household decisions

<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>Participates in <u>all</u> major household decisions</i>		<i>Participates in no major household decisions</i>	
	<i>Wives' responses</i> (1)	<i>Husbands' responses</i> (2)	<i>Wives' responses</i> (3)	<i>Husbands' responses</i> (4)
Living in a village exposed to JS	0.0394** (0.017)	0.1281*** (0.038)	-0.1166*** (0.029)	-0.0222* (0.011)
Mean of control group	0.0619 (0.007)	0.2245 (0.016)	0.2085 (0.018)	0.0453 (0.007)
Log-likelihood	-1130	-1809	-1583	-694
<i>N</i>	2,997	2,632	2,997	2,632
Correlation between errors of the outcome & assignment equations	0.2329** (0.113)	-0.2259** (0.108)	0.2778** (0.124)	0.1095 (0.123)

Notes. In cols. (1)-(2), the dependent variable takes a value 1 if the wife participates in making all major household decisions. In cols. (3)-(4), the dependent variable takes a value 1 if the wife does not participate in making any major household decision. The household decisions considered here are as listed in the text. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. Levels of significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.

Table 6. Wives' and husbands' belief that wife beating can be justified

<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>Wives' responses</i> (1)	<i>Husbands' responses</i> (2)
Living in a village exposed to JS	-0.0069 (0.017)	-0.3068*** (0.026)
Mean of control group	0.0788 (0.009)	0.5726 (0.017)
Log-likelihood	-1315	-2548
<i>N</i>	3,443	3,450
Correlation between errors of the outcome & assignment equations	0.0896 (0.113)	0.0667 (0.085)

Notes. The dependent variable in cols. (1)-(2) takes a value 1 if the respondent believes that wife beating is justified in at least one of the seven situations listed in the text. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.

Table 7. Willingness to report domestic violence and to participate in the demolition of illegal liquor shops

<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>Would report to someone acts of domestic violence he/she witnesses</i>		<i>Would help demolish an illegal liquor shop</i>	
	<i>Wives' responses</i> (1)	<i>Husbands' responses</i> (2)	<i>Wives' responses</i> (3)	<i>Husbands' responses</i> (4)
Living in a village exposed to JS	0.1177*** (0.013)	0.0712*** (0.014)	0.1543*** (0.030)	0.1986*** (0.022)
Mean of control group	0.8461 (0.011)	0.9116 (0.011)	0.5024 (0.015)	0.7141 (0.015)
Log-likelihood	-1392	-1022	-2552	-1913
<i>N</i>	3,408	3,418	3,373	3,378
Correlation between errors of the outcome & assignment equations	-0.1235 (0.099)	-0.1441 (0.131)	0.0531 (0.086)	-0.1391 (0.119)

Notes. The dependent variable in cols. (1)-(2) takes a value 1 if the respondent believes that she/he would report to someone (police station, women's group, *panchayat*, women's family, husband's family, community members, etc.) if they witness an act of domestic violence. The dependent variable in cols. (3)-(4) takes a value 1 if the respondent is willing to participate in movement(s) to demolish illegal liquor shops in their community. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.

Table 8. Lack of awareness of the legal protections for victims of domestic violence

<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>No awareness of laws</i>	
	<i>Wives' responses</i> (1)	<i>Husbands' responses</i> (2)
Living in a village exposed to JS	-0.1192*** (0.028)	-0.0631* (0.034)
Mean of control group	0.5100 (0.014)	0.5085 (0.017)
Log-likelihood	-2685	-2704
<i>N</i>	3,443	3,450
Correlation between errors of the outcome & assignment equations	-0.0060 (0.083)	0.0346 (0.087)

Notes. The dependent variable in cols. (1)-(2) takes a value 1 if the respondent has no awareness of the legal protections for victims of domestic violence (they can file a police report, cannot be evicted by their in-laws, assailants have to cover medical costs arising from domestic violence). Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.

Table 9A. Test of Social desirability bias (Wives' responses)

<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>In times of need, do you have confidence about getting help from:</i>		
	<i>Neighbors</i> (1)	<i>Friends and relatives</i> (2)	<i>Community</i> (3)
Living in a village exposed to <i>JS</i>	-0.0010 (0.015)	0.0020 (0.011)	-0.0078 (0.015)
Mean of control group	0.9240 (0.008)	0.9410 (0.007)	0.9227 (0.008)
Log-likelihood	-1302	-1140	-1323
<i>N</i>	3,405	3,407	3,401
Correlation between errors of the outcome & assignment equations	-0.4750*** (0.103)	-0.5410*** (0.081)	-0.5615*** (0.086)

Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. Levels of significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.

Table 9B. Social desirability survey bias (Husbands' responses)

<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>In times of need, do you have confidence about getting help from:</i>		
	<i>Neighbors</i> (1)	<i>Friends and relatives</i> (2)	<i>Community</i> (3)
Living in a village exposed to <i>JS</i>	0.0106 (0.016)	0.0051 (0.013)	0.0009 (0.016)
Mean of control group	0.9047 (0.008)	0.9327 (0.008)	0.9186 (0.008)
Log-likelihood	-1441	-1221	-1365
<i>N</i>	3,447	3,448	3,445
Correlation between errors of the outcome & assignment equations	-0.1472 (0.133)	-0.2609** (0.124)	-0.2056 (0.130)

Notes. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. Levels of significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.

Table 10. Spillovers: Impact of JS on behavior and awareness of legal protections, disaggregated by whether treatment household lives in an area where JS performs (wives' responses)

<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>Abuse-free</i>	<i>No joint decisions</i>	<i>Lack of awareness of the legal protections for victims of domestic violence</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Respondent lives in locality of treatment village where JS performs (A)	0.0963*** (0.030)	-0.0876*** (0.026)	-0.1172*** (0.024)
Respondent lives in locality of treatment village where JS does not perform (B)	0.0971** (0.045)	-0.1015*** (0.039)	-0.1478*** (0.047)
Difference between (A) & (B) (<i>p</i> -value)	0.9826	0.6044	0.3907
Mean of control group	0.4754 (0.017)	0.1954 (0.019)	0.5160 (0.015)
Log-likelihood	-4204	-2781	-4157
<i>N</i>	3,441	2,997	3443
Correlation between errors of the outcome & assignment equations	0.0552 (0.054)	0.0695 (0.091)	0.0365 (0.059)

Notes. The dependent variables are the same as in Tables 3, 5, and 8. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.

Table 11. Persistence: Impact of JS on behavior and awareness of legal protections, disaggregated by whether respondent lives in a village exposed (or not) to JS plays on patriarchy or alcohol abuse in the last 4 years (wives' responses)

<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>Abuse-free</i>	<i>No joint decisions</i>	<i>Lack of awareness of the legal protections for victims of domestic violence</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Lives in a treatment village that has not been exposed to a JS play on patriarchy or alcohol abuse in the last four years (A)	0.1177*** (0.031)	-0.0898*** (0.026)	-0.1203*** (0.027)
Lives in a treatment village that has been exposed to a JS play on patriarchy or alcohol abuse in the last four years (B)	0.1086*** (0.031)	-0.1073*** (0.033)	-0.1411*** (0.032)
Difference between (A) & (B) (<i>p</i> -value)	0.6757	0.4328	0.5162
Mean of control group	0.4684 (0.016)	0.2002 (0.018)	0.5177 (0.014)
Log-likelihood	-3631	-2319	-3582
<i>N</i>	3441	2,997	3,443
Correlation between errors of the outcome & assignment equations	0.0146 (0.046)	0.1056 (0.079)	0.0460 (0.051)

Notes. The dependent variables are the same as in Tables 3, 5, and 8. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.

Table 12. Impact of JS on behavior and awareness of legal protections, disaggregated by recent performance of JS plays on patriarchy or alcohol abuse & at least one partner in a couple having watched a JS play (wives' responses)

<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>Abuse-free</i>	<i>No joint decisions</i>	<i>Lack of awareness of the legal protections for victims of domestic violence</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Couple has not watched a JS play & JS has not performed a play on patriarchy or alcohol abuse in the village in the last 4 years (A)	0.0726** (0.034)	-0.0614** (0.027)	-0.1064*** (0.039)
Couple has not watched a JS play but JS has performed a play on patriarchy or alcohol abuse in the village in the last 4 years (B)	0.1050*** (0.030)	-0.1014*** (0.027)	-0.0994*** (0.034)
At least one person in the couple has watched a JS play but JS has not performed a play on patriarchy or alcohol abuse in the village in the last 4 years (C)	0.1564*** (0.048)	-0.1135*** (0.032)	-0.1465*** (0.038)
At least one person in the couple has watched a JS play & JS has performed a play on patriarchy or alcohol abuse in the village in the last 4 years (D)	0.1166*** (0.042)	-0.1009** (0.041)	-0.1720*** (0.042)
Difference between (A) & (B) (<i>p</i> - value)	0.3062	0.1470	0.8820
Difference between (A) & (C) (<i>p</i> - value)	0.1557	0.0655*	0.4564
Difference between (A) & (D) (<i>p</i> - value)	0.3412	0.2559	0.2574
Difference between (B) & (C) (<i>p</i> - value)	0.3015	0.6385	0.2795
Difference between (B) & (D) (<i>p</i> - value)	0.7826	0.9853	0.0831*
Difference between (C) & (D) (<i>p</i> - value)	0.2385	0.5897	0.4661
Mean of dependent variable	0.4665 (0.017)	0.1972 (0.019)	0.5215 (0.014)
Log-likelihood	-5084	-3493	-5036
<i>N</i>	3,441	2,997	3,443
Correlation between errors of outcome & assignment equations	-0.0029 (0.052)	0.0871 (0.090)	0.0636 (0.054)

Notes. The dependent variables are the same as in Tables 3, 5, and 8. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.

Table 13. Impact of JS on behavior, disaggregated by age of female respondent

<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>Abuse-free</i>	<i>No joint decisions</i>	<i>Willingness to report domestic violence</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Female respondent's age is less than 30 years (A)	0.1339*** (0.03)	-0.1333*** (0.019)	-0.1014*** (0.016)
Female respondent's age is greater than 30 years (B)	0.1012** (0.045)	-0.0889** (0.030)	-0.1098*** (0.020)
Difference between (A) & (B) (<i>p</i> -value)	0.4141	0.1043	0.4985
Mean of control group	0.4663 (0.018)	0.2034 (0.015)	0.8543 (0.013)
Log-likelihood	-4133	-2719	-2780
<i>N</i>	3432	2,990	3,399
Correlation between errors of the outcome & assignment equations	0.0018 (0.058)	0.135 (0.093)	-0.0002 (0.081)

Notes. The dependent variables are the same as in Tables 3, 5, and 7. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.

Table A-1. Share of women who believe domestic violence is justifiable, and share of women who have suffered intimate partner violence, by country in 2017

	Percentage of women who consider a husband is justified in hitting/beating his wife for at least one specified reason	Percentage of women who ever suffered violence from an intimate partner		Percentage of women who consider a husband is justified in hitting/beating his wife for at least one specified reason	Percentage of women who ever suffered violence from an intimate partner	
	COUNTRY (1)	(2)		COUNTRY (3)	(4)	
LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES	Guinea	92.1	80	Kuwait	37	NA
	Afghanistan	80.2	60.8	Chinese Taipei	21.6	NA
	South Sudan	78.5	NA	Germany	19.6	22
	Somalia	75.7	NA	Korea	18.4	16.5
	Congo (Dem Rep)	74.8	50.7	Switzerland	15.2	9.8
	Chad	73.5	28.6	Argentina	11.6	NA
	Burundi	72.9	46.7	United States	11	35.6
	Mali	72.6	34.6	Chile	10.3	6.7
	Ethiopia	63	28	United Kingdom	10.2	29
	Niger	59.6	NA	Sweden	10.2	28
	Tajikistan	59.6	20.3	Spain	9.6	13
	Haiti	58.9	20.8	Japan	8.9	15.4
	Uganda	58.3	49.9	Hungary	8.7	21
	Tanzania	58	41.7	Poland	7.9	13
	Senegal	56.5	78	Canada	7.8	1.9
	Yemen	48.7	67	France	6.6	26
	Madagascar	45.2	30	Netherlands	6.4	25
	Burkina Faso	43.5	11.5	Italy	5.3	19
	Nepal	42.9	25	Australia	3.2	16.9
	Rwanda	41.4	34.4	Austria	3	13
Zimbabwe	38.7	35.4	Belgium	2	24	
Benin	36	68.6	Czech Republic	2	21	
Togo	28.7	22.1	Greece	2	19	
Mozambique	22.9	21.7	Portugal	2	19	
Malawi	16.3	37.5				
	MEDIAN	58.3	35	MEDIAN	8.8	19
LOWER MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES	Sri Lanka	53.2	16.6	South Africa	61.2	20.6
	Myanmar	51.2	33	Iraq	54.8	21.2
	Cambodia	50.4	20.9	Guinea	52.6	56.9
	Côte d'Ivoire	47.9	25.9	Algeria	48.2	NA
	Zambia	46.9	42.7	Malaysia	41.5	NA
	Pakistan	42.2	85	China	32.7	NA
	Kenya	41.8	39.4	Peru	32.2	33.2
	Uzbekistan	41.5	NA	Azerbaijan	28	13.5
	Cameroon	36.1	51.1	Ecuador	25.2	37.5
	Egypt	35.7	NA	Russia	23.3	19.6
	Nigeria	34.7	16.2	Iran	21	66
	Indonesia	34.5	18.3	Jordan	18	23.6
	Sudan	34	NA	Kazakhstan	14.2	16.5
	Bangladesh	28.3	53.3	Turkey	13.3	38
	Ghana	28.3	24.4	Colombia	11.1	37.4
	Viet Nam	28.2	34.4	Guatemala	11	18
	Angola	25.2	34.8	Thailand	8.6	44.2
	India	22.1	28.7	Brazil	8.5	33.5
	Morocco	22	30	Romania	7.5	24
	Tunisia	18.6	20.3	Mexico	5	14.1
Bolivia	16.1	64.1	Belarus	4.1	25	
Philippines	12.9	16.9	Cuba	3.9	NA	
Honduras	12.4	21.6	Serbia	3.8	23.7	
Ukraine	2.9	13.2	Dominican Republic	2	20.4	
	MEDIAN	34.25	28.7	MEDIAN	16.1	23.85
HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES						

Notes. The respondents in cols.1 and 3 are nationally representative samples of women 15-49 years of age. The five reasons that are specified are: the wife burns the food, she argues with her husband, she goes out without telling him, she neglects the children, and she refuses sexual relations with him. Cols. 2 and 4 show the percentage of women who have ever suffered intimate partner physical and/or sexual violence. Omitted from the table are countries with populations less than 0.1% of the world's total population and countries for which data were not available.

Source: OECD Gender, Institutions, and Development Database (GID-DB), 2019.

<https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=GIDDB2019>

Table A-2. Anderson's sharpened q -values and associated p -values for Tables 3-8

<i>Dependent variable</i>		Treatment effect	p-value	<i>Sharpened q-value</i>
Table	<i>Wives' responses</i>			
3	Emotional abuse	-0.0506	0.06*	0.03**
3	Physical abuse	-0.0805	0.00***	0.00***
3	Sexual abuse	-0.0439	0.04**	0.02**
3	Abuse-free	0.1318	0.00***	0.00***
4	Freedom from marital control	0.0512	0.00***	0.00***
4	Verbal or physical abuse due to husband's drinking	-0.0398	0.03**	0.02**
4	Whether husband drinks	-0.0526	0.01***	0.01***
5	Participates in all major household decisions	0.0394	0.02**	0.02**
5	Participates in no major household decisions	-0.1166	0.00***	0.00***
6	Attitudes toward wife beating	-0.0069	0.68	0.07*
7	Would report to someone acts of domestic violence he/she witnesses	0.1177	0.00***	0.00***
7	Would help demolish an illegal liquor shop	0.1543	0.00***	0.00***
8	No awareness of laws	-0.1192	0.00***	0.00***
	<i>Husbands' responses</i>			
4	Verbal or physical abuse due to husband's drinking	-0.1184	0.00***	0.00***
5	Participates in all major household decisions	0.1281	0.00***	0.00***
5	Participates in no major household decisions	-0.0222	0.05**	0.02**
6	Attitudes toward wife beating	-0.3068	0.00***	0.00***
7	Would report to someone acts of domestic violence he/she witnesses	0.0712	0.00***	0.00***
7	Would help demolish an illegal liquor shop	0.1986	0.00***	0.00***
8	No awareness of laws	-0.0631	0.06*	0.02**

Notes. Sharpened q -values are based on Anderson (2008). Levels of significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.

Table A-3. Impact of JS on behavior and awareness of legal protections, disaggregated by household head's level of education (wives' responses)

<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>Abuse-free</i>	<i>No joint decisions</i>	<i>No knowledge about laws against domestic violence</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Household head has no formal education (A)	0.1104*** (0.039)	-0.0864** (0.035)	-0.1017*** (0.034)
Household head has education up to primary school (B)	0.0865*** (0.030)	-0.0663*** (0.025)	-0.1424*** (0.041)
Household head has education beyond primary school (C)	0.1235*** (0.047)	-0.1099*** (0.029)	-0.1437** (0.059)
Difference between (A) & (B) (<i>p</i> -value)	0.5871	0.5437	0.2883
Difference between (A) & (C) (<i>p</i> -value)	0.7741	0.4528	0.4553
Difference between (B) & (C) (<i>p</i> -value)	0.3910	0.1153	0.9762
<i>Mean of dependent variable for the control group by education level of household head</i>			
No formal education	0.4357 (0.024)	0.1846 (0.020)	0.5738 (0.024)
Primary school only	0.5078 (0.022)	0.1883 (0.018)	0.5588 (0.022)
Beyond primary school	0.5339 (0.021)	0.1730 (0.016)	0.4721 (0.021)
Log-likelihood	-4098	-2731	-4053
<i>N</i>	2,983	2,586	2,985
Correlation between errors of the outcome & assignment equations	0.0267 (0.056)	0.0272 (0.080)	0.0473 (0.056)

Notes. The dependent variable in the columns are the same as in Tables 3, 5, and 8. . Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.

Online Appendix Table 1. Comparison of endogenous and exogenous treatment models where the null hypothesis $\rho=0$ is accepted

<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>Endogenous treatment</i>	<i>Exogenous treatment</i>
Emotional abuse	-0.0506* (0.027)	-0.0764*** (0.022)
Physical abuse	-0.0805*** (0.020)	-0.0546*** (0.018)
Sexual abuse	-0.0439** (0.021)	-0.0280* (0.018)
Abuse-free	0.1318*** (0.028)	0.1169*** (0.023)
Freedom from marital control	0.0512*** (0.013)	0.0590*** (0.012)
Whether husband drinks (wives' responses)	-0.0526*** (0.021)	-0.0271 (0.021)
Verbal or physical abuse due to husband's drinking (wives' responses) Full sample	-0.0398** (0.019)	0.0006 (0.014)
Verbal or physical abuse due to husband's drinking (wives' responses) Subsample	-0.2258*** (0.042)	-0.1657*** (0.033)
Participates in all major decisions (wives' responses)	0.0394*** (0.017)	0.0577*** (0.014)
Participates in no major decisions (wives' responses)	-0.1166*** (0.029)	-0.0799*** (0.019)
Participates in all major decisions (husbands' responses)	0.1281*** (0.038)	0.0872*** (0.028)

Online Appendix Table 2A. Wives' participation in making major household decisions (wives' responses)

<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>Looking after children's education & family health</i>	<i>Purchase of major household items</i>	<i>Visiting relatives</i>	<i>Children's marriages</i>	<i>Number of children to bear</i>	<i>Use of contraceptives</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Living in a village exposed to JS	0.0648** (0.033)	0.0580* (0.032)	0.1063*** (0.029)	0.0625* (0.035)	0.1697*** (0.037)	0.1591*** (0.032)
Mean of control group	0.5012 (0.018)	0.3829 (0.015)	0.2198 (0.134)	0.5545 (0.018)	0.4361 (0.018)	0.2866 (0.015)
Log-likelihood	-2362	-2311	-1976	-2337	-2336	-2249
<i>N</i>	2997	2997	2997	2997	2997	2997
Correlation between errors of the outcome and assignment equations	0.0307 (0.096)	0.1442* (0.086)	0.0638 (0.115)	0.1368 (0.097)	-0.0899 (0.097)	-0.0384 (0.088)

Online Appendix Table 2B. Wives' participation in making major household decisions (husband's responses)

<i>Dependent variable</i>	<i>Looking after children's education & family health</i>	<i>Purchase of major household items</i>	<i>Visiting relatives</i>	<i>Children's marriages</i>	<i>Number of children to bear</i>	<i>Use of contraceptives</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Living in a village exposed JS	0.1548*** (0.039)	0.1173*** (0.034)	0.1240*** (0.002)	0.0838*** (0.022)	0.0823*** (0.025)	0.0967*** (0.024)
Mean of control group	0.4821 (0.021)	0.4388 (0.021)	0.4556 (0.019)	0.7750 (0.015)	0.8287 (0.016)	0.8375 (0.017)
Log-likelihood	-2019	-2077	-2050	-1536	-1314	-1209
<i>N</i>	2632	2632	2632	2632	2632	2632
Correlation between errors of the outcome and assignment equations	0.0671 (0.104)	-0.1883* (0.106)	-0.0776 (0.100)	0.0225 (0.097)	-0.0411 (0.111)	-0.1641 (0.111)

Centre for Training & Research in Public Finance & Policy (CTRFPF)

Jana Sanskriti Project

Men's Questionnaire

Oral Consent (Please say to respondent)

Greetings. My name is _____. I have come from the Centre for Training and Research in Public Finance and Policy, CSSSC. CTRFPF is a leading research organisation in public finance and public policy and we conduct a lot of surveys on various social issues such as agriculture, education, health, water, sanitation, governance, etc. Currently we are carrying out a survey regarding the awareness about social issues. In this regard we wish to talk to you for some time. The interview will take about 45 minutes to complete. Whatever information you provide will be kept strictly confidential and will not be revealed. May I continue?

BLOCK 1M: TRACKING INFORMATION FOR HOUSEHOLD

1.1M	District Code 18	1.2M	Block Code	1.3 M	Household Code □□□□□
1.4M	Gram Panchayat name & code			□□	
1.5M	Village name & code			□□□□□□□□	
	[A] Police Station				
1.6M	[A] Name of respondent				
	[B] Relationship with female respondent				
	[C] Relationship to head of household				
1.7M	[a] Name of locality & landmark				
	[b] Respondent's phone number:				
1.8M	Which social group do you belong to?			Scheduled Caste (SC)	1
				Scheduled Tribe (ST)	2
				Other Backward Caste (OBC)	3
				General	4

1.9M Date of survey			/			/	2	0	1	
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1.10M Name of investigator										
Signature										

1.11M Start time of interview			:			AM / PM
1.12M End time of interview			:			AM / PM

Field investigator's comments										
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Block 6: Men's opinions on social issues

6.1	Do you know if in your locality there exists any organization (co-operative / <i>Bandhan</i> / club) that gives loans to women to start their own business and /or to expand their existing business?	1. Yes	2. No
6.2	Suppose because of any of the reasons below, a husband argues / fights with his wife, do you think that is right?		
	[a] Go out of the house (market, relative's house) without husband's permission	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[b] Ignore her responsibility with respect to the house (not cook properly, keep the house clean or look after child's studies)	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[b] Argue with husband	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[c] Avoid physical intimacy with husband	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[d] Disrespect in-laws	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[e] Husband suspects that his wife is cheating on him	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[f] Wife is childless	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[g] In your opinion any other possible event [Specify]	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
6.3	Suppose because of any of the reasons below, a husband beats up his wife, do you think that is right?		
	[a] Go out of the house (market, relative's house) without husband's permission	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[b] Ignore her responsibility with respect to the house (not cook properly, keep the house clean or look after child's studies)	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[b] Argue with husband	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[c] Avoid physical intimacy with husband	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[d] Disrespect in-laws	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[e] Husband suspects that his wife is cheating on him	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[f] Wife is childless	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[g] In your opinion any other possible event [Specify]	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
6.4	In your opinion if a husband harrasses (physically or emotionally) his wife should she go and complain to anybody?	1. Yes	2. No <i>Goto 7.1</i>
6.5	Of the persons mentioned below, whom should she complaint to?		
	<i>Tick on all appropriate responses</i>		
	[a] Villagers		
	[b] Other members of the inlaws' household		
	[c] A member of parents household		
	[d] Police station		
	[e] Gram panchayat		
	[f] Others [Specify]		

Tell the respondent: I am going to ask you some personal questions. Your responses will be kept confidential

Block 7: Awareness about domestic violence in family

7.1	Who decides how the earnings of your wife will be used?	[1] Myself [2] Wife [3] Wife & I jointly [4] Others (specify) [5] Wife does not work				
7.2	Who takes decisions on the following issues?					
Code : 1. Myself 2. Wife 3. My wife and I 4. All members in the family 5. Others (<i>Specify</i>)						
[a] Children's studies		1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
[b] Health decisions about a family member		1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
[c] Purchase a major item in household (Motorcycle, Television, Mobile phone, etc.)		1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
[d] Purchase of household's daily needs (food, etc.)		1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
[e] Visiting your parent's or other relatives house		1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
[f] Marriage of their children		1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
[g] Number of children to have		1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
<i>If respondent is beyond child bearing age write 'Not applicable'</i>		1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
[h] Use of contraception		1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
<i>If respondent is beyond child bearing age write 'Not applicable'</i>		1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
7.3	Do you or your husband argue / fight with each other for any of the reasons below?	1. Yes	2. No	• Tick on all applicable responses • If tubes are ligated then write 'Not applicable' against option [g]		
[a] Issues related to spending money						
[b] Looking after the children						
[c] Cooking, other household work etc.						
[d] If your husband thinks that you are disrespecting your in-laws						
[e] Go out of the house (market, relative's house) without your husband's permission						
[f] If you are involved in social works						
[g] Contraception						
[h] If your husband consumes alcohol or uses drugs						

7.4	Are any of the following relevant to you or to your wife?		1. Yes	2. No
	[a] Do you and your wife have a disagreement if she does not ask you before spending money?			
	[b] Do you and your wife have a disagreement if she goes out with her friends without informing you?			
	[c] Do you and your wife have a disagreement if she wants to go to her parent's house to meet them?			
	[d] Do you and your wife have a disagreement if you scold/humiliate your wife in public?			
	[e] Any other event (Specify)			
7.5	If you see that in the village there is an illegal alcohol shop and/or liquor is being made will you take any steps to stop it?	1. Yes	2. No	
		Goto 7.6	Goto 7.8	
7.6	If you will take some steps then who from the following list will you inform?		1. Yes	2. No
	<i>Read out the codes</i>			
	[a] Inform the police station			
	[b] Inform a women's group			
	[c] Inform the panchayat			
	[d] Others (Specify)			
7.7	In your opinion, would it be of any use, if you register your complaint with any of the above people?		1. Yes	2. No
7.8	Do you know that if a woman is tortured in her inlaws house she can register a police case against her inlaws or take legal steps against the those victimizing you?		1. Yes	2. No
7.9	Do you know that a women can take recourse of the law if she is thrown out of her inlaws house or caan prevent from being thown out her house?		1. Yes	2. No
7.10	Do you know that a woman can also ask for monetary compensation for maintenance allowance to meet any expenses incurred as a result of violence faced and for injuries (mental or physical) sustained due to domestic violence?		1. Yes	2. No
7.11	Have you heard about the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act that the Government of India has passed in 2005?		1. Yes	2. No

Block 12: Knowledge about *Jana Sanskriti**Only in treatment villages*

12.1	Have you heard about <i>Jana Sanskriti</i> ?	1. Yes	2. No	
			Block/ Interview ends	
12.2A	Are you associated with <i>Jana Sanskriti</i> ?	1. Yes	2. No	
			<i>Goto 12.3</i>	
12.2B	In what capacity are you associated with <i>Jana Sanskriti</i> ?	<i>Tick all appropriate</i>		
		1. Yes	2. No	
	[a] Worker	1	2	
	[b] Ex-worker	1	2	
	[c] Member of human rights group of <i>Jana Sanskriti</i>	1	2	
	[d] Actor in <i>Jana Sanskriti</i> play	1	2	
	[e] Forum participant of <i>JS</i> play	1	2	
	[f] Not associated with <i>JS</i>			
	[g] Others (Specify)			
12.3	[a] Have you watched any <i>JS</i> play in the last one year?	1. Yes		2. No
	[b] How many <i>JS</i> plays have you watched so far?	1	2 - 3	4+
	[c] When was the last time you watched a <i>JS</i> play (how many days ago)?			
12.4	[a] Have you acted in any <i>JS</i> play in the last one year?	1. Yes		2. No
	[b] How many <i>JS</i> plays have you acted in so far?	1	2 - 3	4+
	[c] When was the last time you acted in a <i>JS</i> play (how many days ago)?			

Thank you

Centre for Training & Research in Public Finance & Policy (CTRPFP)

Jana Sanskriti Project

Women's Questionnaire

Oral Consent (Please say to respondent)

Namaste. My name is _____. I have come from Centre for Training and Research in Public Finance and Policy, CSSSC. CTRPFP is a leading research organisation in public finance and public policy and we conduct a lot of studies on various social issues such as agriculture, education, health, water, sanitation, governance, etc. Currently we are carrying out survey regarding the awareness about social issues. In this regard we wish to talk to you for some time. The interview will take about 45 minutes to complete. Whatever information you provide will be kept strictly confidential and will not be revealed. May I continue?

BLOCK 1F: TRACKING INFORMATION FOR HOUSEHOLD

1.1F	District Code 18	1.2F	Block Code	1.3F	Household Code <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
1.4F	GP name & code	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>			
1.5F	Village name & code	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>			
1.6F	[A] Police Station			[B] Booth No.:	
1.7F	[A] Name of respondent				
	[B] Relationship with male respondent				
	[C] Relationship to head of household				
1.8F	Name of locality				
1.9F	[A] Respondent's code from family roster (ID Code)	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>			
	[B] Respondent's phone number:				

I.10F	Household survey code	Original household	1	→Goto I.12F
		Replacement household	2	→Goto I.11F
I.11F	Reasons for using a substitution household	Could not find a male women pair in household	1	
		No married women available in the household	2	
		Family members were not ready to give the interviews	3	
		No family member present to give the interview	4	
		Others (specify)	7	

I.12F Date of survey			/			/	2	0	1	
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I.13F Name of investigator	
Signature	

I.14F Start time of interview			:			AM / PM
I.15F End time of interview			:			AM / PM

Field investigator's comments

Block 5. Women's opinions on social issues

5.1	Do you know if in your locality there exists any organization (co-operative / <i>Bandhan</i> / club) that gives loans to women to start their own business and /or to expand their existing business?	1. Yes	2. No
5.2	Suppose because of any of the reasons below, a husband argues / fights with his wife, do you think that is right?		
	[a] Go out of the house (market, relative's house) without husband's permission	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[b] Ignore her responsibility with respect to the house (not cook properly, keep the house clean or look after child's studies)	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[b] Argue with husband	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[c] Avoid physical intimacy with husband	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[d] Disrespect in-laws	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[e] Husband suspects that his wife is cheating on him	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[f] Wife is childless	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[g] In your opinion any other possible event [Specify]	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
5.3	Suppose because of any of the reasons below, a husband beats up his wife, do you think that is right?		
	[a] Go out of the house (market, relative's house) without husband's permission	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[b] Ignore her responsibility with respect to the house (not cook properly, keep the house clean or look after child's studies)	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[b] Argue with husband	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[c] Avoid physical intimacy with husband	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[d] Disrespect in-laws	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[e] Husband suspects that his wife is cheating on him	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[f] Wife is childless	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
	[g] In your opinion any other possible event [Specify]	1. Yes	2. No 9. Don't know
5.4	In your opinion if a husband harrases (physically or emotionally) his wife should she go and complain to anybody?	1. Yes	2. No <i>Goto 6.1</i>
5.5	Of the persons mentioned below, whom should she complaint to?		
	<i>Tick on all appropriate responses</i>		
	[a] Villagers		
	[b] Other members of the inlaws' household		
	[c] A member of parents household		
	[d] Police station		
	[e] Gram panchayat		
	[f] Others [Specify]		

Tell the respondent: I am going to ask you some personal questions. Your responses will be kept confidential

Block 6 : Awareness about domestic violence in family

6.1	In the last 12 months , besides the household work have you done any other job outside the house?	1. Yes	2. No
6.2	If you had your own money (wages from work, gift, or in bank or SHG account) then would you be able to spend that money according to your own wish?	1. Yes 2.No, do not have money of my own 3. No, will not be able to spend on my own	
6.3	Who takes decisions on the following issues? Code : 1. Myself 2. Husband 3. My husband and I 4. All members in the family 5. Others (Specify)		
	[a] Children's studies	1.	2. 3. 4. 5.
	[b] Health decisions about a family member	1.	2. 3. 4. 5.
	[c] Purchase a major item in household (Motorcycle, Television, Mobile phone, etc.)	1.	2. 3. 4. 5.
	[d] Purchase of household's daily needs (food, etc.)	1.	2. 3. 4. 5.
	[e] Visiting your parent's or other relatives house	1.	2. 3. 4. 5.
	[f] Marriage of their children	1.	2. 3. 4. 5.
	[g] Number of children to have	1.	2. 3. 4. 5.
	<i>If respondent is beyond child bearing age write 'Not applicable'</i>	1.	2. 3. 4. 5.
	[h] Use of contraception	1.	2. 3. 4. 5.
	<i>If respondent is beyond child bearing age write 'Not applicable'</i>	1.	2. 3. 4. 5.
6.4	Do you or your husband argue / fight with each other for any of the reasons below?	1. Yes	2. No
	[a] Issues related to spending money		
	[b] Looking after the children		
	[c] Cooking, other household work etc.		
	[d] If your husband thinks that you are disrespecting your in-laws		
	[e] Go out of the house (market, relative's house) without your husband's permission		
	[f] If you are involved in social works		
	[g] Contraception		
	[h] If your husband consumes alcohol or uses drugs		
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Tick on all applicable responses</i> • <i>If tubes are ligated then write 'Not applicable' against option [g]</i> 	

6.5	Are any of the following relevant to you or to your husband?		1. Yes	2. No
	[a] He trusts you with respect to money issues			
	[b] Your husband allows you to meet with your friends			
	[c] Your husband allows only minimal contact with your parent's house			
	[d] Has your husband in front of others disrespected you or humiliated you and/or made you feel lowly about yourself?			
	[e] Forced you to have physical intimacy			
	[f] Threatened you with physical violence and / or to harm a person who is close to you			
	[g] Has your husband physically violated you (slapped, pulled hair / twist wrists / hit by throwing things at you)?			
	[h] Has tried to harm you or threatened to harm you by strangling, burning or using a knife, gun or any other weapon?			
[i] Any other event (Specify)				
6.6	In any physical or emotional altercation with your husband, did you ever try to protect yourself by hitting back, or taking somebody's help?		1. Yes	2. No
			<i>Goto 6.7</i>	<i>Goto 6.8</i>
6.7	Whom do you seek help from?	[a] Own family [b] Husband's family [c] Friend [d] Activist [e] Political person [f] Panchayat [g] Police [h] Lawyer [i] NGO [j] Do not take any help [k] Others [Specify]	<i>Tick on all applicable responses</i>	

6.8	Generally other than your husband, has anybody else hit you / harrassed you/ disrespected you or humiliated you? If answer to above question is yes, then who hit you / harrassed you/ disrespected you or humiliated you? (Tick all responses)	1. Yes	→		<i>Tick on all applicable responses</i>	
		2. No			[a] Mother / Step-mother	[b] Father / Step-father
6.9	[a] Do you fall ill frequently?	1. Yes		2. No		
	<i>Goto 6.10</i>					
	[b] If you fall ill frequently, do you have to face any of the events listed below?					
	<i>*Read out the codes</i>			<i>* Tick on ll applicable</i>		
	[a] Husband subjects me to mental torture	1. Yes	2. No	9. Don't know / Can't say		
	[b] Husband subjects me to physical torture	1. Yes	2. No	9. Don't know / Can't say		
	[c] Does not want me to go to a doctor	1. Yes	2. No	9. Don't know / Can't say		
[d] Others (Specify)	1. Yes	2. No	9. Don't know / Can't say			
6.10	[a] Does your husband do drugs or consume alcohol?	<i>All drugs that lead to physical violence</i>		6.10[b] Does he indulge in using drugs / alcohol frequently?		
	1. Yes			2. No	1. Frequently	
		<i>Goto 6.11</i>				
6.11	If you see that in the village there is an illegal alcohol shop and/or liquor is being made wil lyou take any steps to stop it?	1. Yes		2. No		
		<i>Goto 6.12</i>		<i>Goto 6.14</i>		
6.12	If you will take some steps then who from the following list will you inform?	1. Yes		2. No		
	<i>Read out the codes</i>					
	[a] Inform the police station					
	[b] Inform a women's group					
	[c] Inform the panchayat					
[d] Others (Specify)						
6.13	In your opinion, would it be of any use, if you register your complaint with any of the above people?	1. Yes		2. No		

6.14	Do you know that if a woman is tortured in her inlaws house she can register a police case against her inlaws or take legal steps against the those victimizing you?	1. Yes 2. No
6.15	Do you know that a women can take recourse of the law if she is thrown out of her inlaws house or caan prevent from being thown out her house?	1. Yes 2. No
6.16	Do you know that a woman can also ask for monetary compensation for maintenance allowance to meet any expenses incurred as a result of violence faced and for injuries (mental or physical) sustained due to domestic violence?	1. Yes 2. No
6.17	Have you heard about the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act that the Government of India has passed in 2005?	1. Yes 2. No

Block 7. Woman's opinion about her children

7.1	Do you have achild that is less than 15 years old?	1. Yes	2. No <i>Goto 7.8</i>
7.2	[a] No of daughters less than 15 years:	[b] No of sons less than 15 years:	
7.3	[a] Name of oldest daughter who is less than 15 years old	[b] Name of oldest son who is less than 15 years old	
7.4	How far would you like the daughter mentioned in 7.3 to study? (if you can afford her education expenses)	How far would you like the son mentioned in 7.3 [b] to study? (if you can afford her education expenses)	
	[1] Primary school [2] Upper primary [3] Secodary school [4] Higher secobdary school [5] College (B.A./B.Sc.) [6] University (M.A./M.Sc.) [7] Professional courses [8] Not required to study [9] Others (Specify)	[1] Primary school [2] Upper primary [3] Secodary school [4] Higher secobdary school [5] College (B.A./B.Sc.) [6] University (M.A./M.Sc.) [7] Professional Courses [8] Not required to study [9] Others (Specify)	

Block II: Awareness about *Jana Sanskriti**This block should be administered in treatment villages only*

II.1	Have you heard about <i>Jana Sanskriti</i> ?	1. Yes	2. No	
			Block/ Interview ends	
II.2L	Are you involved with <i>Jana Sanskriti</i> ?	1. Yes	2. No	
			Goto II.3	
II.2M	If yes, how are you involved with <i>Jana Sanskriti</i> ?	Record all responses		
		Code:	1. Yes	2. No
	[a] Worker	1	2	
	[b] Ex-worker	1	2	
	[c] Human rights cell worker	1	2	
	[d] Acts in <i>Jana Sanskriti</i> 's plays	1	2	
	[e] Participates in <i>Janasankriti</i> 's forum discussion	1	2	
	[f] Others (Specify)			
II.3	[a] Have you watched a <i>Jana Sanskriti</i> enacted play in the last one year?	1. Yes		2. No
	[b] How many plays enacted by <i>Jana Sanskriti</i> have you watched?	1	2 - 3	4+
	[c] When is the last time you watched a <i>Jana Sankrti</i> play? [No. of days]			
II.4	[a] Have you enacted in a <i>Jana Sanskriti</i> play in the last one year?	1. Yes		2. No
	[b] In how many plays performed by <i>Jana Sanskriti</i> have you enacted?	1	2 - 3	4+
	[c] When is the last time you enacted in a <i>Jana Sankrti</i> play? [No. of days]			

Thank you!